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"Excellence in the Surface Navy" is examined, first by
interviewing twenty cne senior naval officers and then by
going aboard six ships identified by the senior officers as
keinc the enbodiment cf excellence. Chapters I through IV
is a summary of the indicators of excellence on which the
senior officers focused. Such topics as awards, ship clean-
liness, and operational performance are discussed. Chapter
V sumnari2es the views of these senior officers on the means
used to achieve excellence. From the shipboard interviews,
it is concluded that the excellent ships possess a common
set cf attributes that account for their excellence. The
attributes are: good ships getting better; pride in
evidence at all levels; teamwork, not just a concept but a
way of life; the shif in automatic; high energy level/bias
towards action; presence of a common vision and shared
values; as the captain, so is the ship; sailors, cur most
important resource; and oh yes, task accomplishment. These
attributes are discussed in chapters VI through XV.
Recommendations are made for expanding analysis of excel-
lence in the Surface Navy and other naval communities.
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Ever wonder what criteria the commodore used to rate
your ship against the others in the sguadron, what those
captains on the type commanders staff used to judge the
performance of one ship in the force against another, or
maybe how that ship across the pier which won the Battle "E"
or the Marjorie Sterrett award did things differently than
your ship? Well, we did. And for a change, we had the time
to attempt to find answers to these questions. But where to
begin? How about by asking these senior officers what they
were thinking when they were observing and judging the ships
in the Surface Navy, getting their recommendations of ships
that personified their definition of excellence, and then
going aroard those ships to find out how they conducted
business. That's what we did. We learned that a lot of our
hunches were correct, a couple were dead wrong, and that
talking with the bosses and observing the superstars was an
opportunity from which every member of the surface community
could benefit.
In our research of "excellence in the Surface Navy" we
wanted to find ships that were the embodiment of superior
performance and then, as best we could, to tell their story:
what they look like, what they emphasize, why they manage
and lead the way they do, and how they go about achieving
the results that gain them the reputation of being excel-
lent. Gbviously, this was no small undertaking. But under-
take it we did, and we think our findings will be of
interest to surface warfare officers and enlisted personnel,
not because this is a definitive study or because this study
provides in an easy-to-understand cookbook manner how cne
achieves excellence in surface ships, but because this
allows the reader to approach the subject of shipboard lead-
ership and management from a positive perspective instead of
the all too common "don't do this because ..." teaching we
frequently encounter in the surface community. Obviously
there is a place for learning from the mistakes of others
(no cne likes to repeat a mistake or relearn a painful
lesson) , tut we feel that there is a lot to be learned from
those who have been successful at shipboard leadership and
management, and that in the past, this source of positive
information has not been tapped to the extent it could or
should be.
Father than rely on a group of numerical indicators
(e.g., inspection results, readiness ratings, retention
ratings) to identify a group of excellent ships, we elected
to identify the ships that we would study by getting the
subjective opinions of senior naval officers intimately
involved with surface ships in the Atlantic and Pacific
Fleets. We chose this approach because, in the final anal-
ysis, it is the opinions of senior officers in the surface
warfare community that count the most when determining what
is considered good and bad in the community and who will be
selected to lead the community in the future. For, although
a lot of attention is given to scores on exercises and
inspections and statistics for retention and readiness
ratings, the selection of Battle "E" winners and the
criteria used to select officers for promotion still rely
primarily on subjective judgement by seniors of their
juniors. Ir conducting our study, we interviewed twenty one
officers whc were either senior, post-command officers on
the surface type commander staffs or were sguadron or group
commanders. We asked these officers to explain how they
judged surface ships and how they differentiated between top
performing excellent ships and fleet average ships. We also
asked them to provide any insight they might have regarding
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how they thought top performing ships conducted business,
that is, what did the top performing ships appear to be
doing differently than the other ships? After these senior
officers provided us with their views on surface ship excel-
lence, we asked them to identify ships that personified
excellence as they had just described it. This they did
with gusto. They did not have to do a lot of thinking to
come up with the naies of ships that stood out for their
excellence. Many ships were mentioned. In general, there
was a feeling that there are a lot of good ships sitting at
the piers and steaming to their next station assignment;
however, there were a relatively small number of ships that
were consensus stand outs, the type of ships we were after.
We ended up with a list of ten ships in each fleet. We then
were able to identify four ships in each fleet that were (1)
en the consensus excellent ship list and (2) available for
interviews during the time we wanted to conduct the
interviews.
In chapters two through five, we will take you to the
commodore's cabin and to the halls of the type commander to
let you hear what twenty one senior surface warfare officers
had to say about excellence in the Surface Navy. Then in
chapters six through fifteen we will take you aboard ships
that these senior officers felt were the embodiment of
excellence, and we will attempt to tell their story.
There were few surprises in listening to senior officers
discuss excellence in the Surface Navy; yet, we believe many
surface warfaremen will be interested in hearing what they
had to say about such topics as the roles they see captains
and chiefs filling en their excellent ships and what they
look for when they sit in their offices and visit their
ships, all the time judging and determining how effective a
ship is. We would describe our interviews with senior offi-
cers as interesting and informative, and if we had finished
11
cur study with just the interviews, we would have considered
it a highly rewarding and worthwhile experience. We felt
that the interviews provided us with insight into what
excellence in the Surface Navy looks like and how it is
achieved, and that with this insight we could beccme more
effective naval officers. However, we did not appreciate
that the best was yet to come, for if seeing is believing,
we are new believers. We believe that there is excellence
in the Surface Navy. There are ships that are not just
tetter than other ships, but ships that stand head and
shoulders above the ships they steam in company with. And
going arcard these excellent ships is not only interesting,
it is enlightening. Having seen excellence in action, we
now feel that we are much tetter prepared to strive for it
in the remainder of cur careers. We hope that the reader
can share in our enlightenment as he reads our description
of excellence in the Surface Navy.
12
II. THEI1RE WATCHING
They're out there. ...the commanders and captains and
commodores and admirals who work on the group and type
commander staffs. They're the ones who give your ship a
mission, who read your messages, who monitor your inspec-
tion results, who hear the latest gossip about your ship.
You may or may not ever see them face to face. But they're
out there. And somehcw they're sizing up your ship. Hew do
they dc it? What do they think the best ships are doing
that average ones aren't? How long does it take them to
formulate an opinion of a ship? What characteristics of
excellence can they "see" from their desks? What do they
find when they arrive aboard the best ships? These are the
guestions we sought answers for as we talked to these
officers
.
Having the opportunity to get their candid opinions was
a very rewarding experience, to say the least. After all,
how often do a couple of mid grade surface warfare officers
get to find out what so many senior officers think about
excellence in the surface Navy? Without exception, we were
impressed with the candor and energy of the officers we
interviewed. We left every meeting feeling the Navy had
done something very right in placing such dynamic officers
in their current positions of leadership.
What we learned from talking to these officers was that
on the one hand there definitely is a general consensus at
their level as to what excellence in the Surface Navy locks
like. On the other hand, variety enters the discussion when
you ask them how such excellence is achieved, although the
basic tenets of leadership and management remain.
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But w€ are getting ahead of ourselves. Let us give you
some insight into the process we used to gather and distill
our data. In developing our interview questions, we used a
model for ar.alyzing organizations called the IS model. We
hit upon the idea of using the 7S model while reading Peters
and Waterman's book, In Sea rch of Excellence, a recent best
seller that attempted to do with excellent American busi-
nesses what we were attempting to do with excellent U. S.
Navy ships, namely identify what made them excellent. This
model, as adapted by us for Navy ships, looks at organiza-
tions from the following perspectives:
STYLE: Officer and enlisted leadership style.
SKILLS: Unigue talents and experiences of key offi-
cers and eDlisted personnel.
STRATEGY: A command's direction and plan of action
for the future.
STAFF: Professional background and experience of
officers and enlisted personnel.
SYSTEMS: How information moves around the ship, and
how specific programs are administered.
STRUCTURE: Characteristics of the ship's organiza-
tion chart, including both primary responsibilities and
collateral/secondary responsibilities.
SHARED VALUES: Intangibles, such as the command
attitude, values, norms, and guiding concepts.
We began the process of summarizing our findings by
listing the indications of excellence identified by each
officer. From this list, we identified those indications
which were stressed repeatedly. Ke further grouped these
indications into two troad categories, namely "external" and
"waterfront" indicators of excellence. The external indi-
cators of excellence are those which senior officers can
monitor without physically seeing the ship. These frequently
14
would be the measures by which the type commander or an
officer on his staff would judge a ship. Waterfront indica-
tors of excellence are those which senior officers observe
ty actually visiting the ship and observing it first hand,
on the deck plates. These indicators would normally be
observed by squadron commodores, their staffs, and others
who gain impressions of ships by visiting them.
We begin by summarizing the external indicators of
excellence. Keep in mind that what you are about to read is
not presented as a recipe for leadership or management
success. These are just the points which the officers we
interviewed stressed.
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Ill, EXTERNAL INDICATORS OF EXCELLENCE
A. GCING THE EXTRA BILE
It almost goes without saying that senior officers
consider operational performance to be an important, the
most important, measure of excellence in the fleet. They
expect all ships to able to get underway and meet their
commitments. However, once they are underway, a group of
ships emerges as standouts, not in any one area, but across
the board. Furthermore, when these superstars return to
port, they perform as they had at sea. There is a definite
link between excellence in port and underway. It is the
ships which are both top steamers and tops pierside which
personify excellence in the Surface Navy.
Eut what are these ships doing differently? To begin
with, the best ships invariably demonstrate a willingness to
"go the extra mile." They put forth greater effort than
average shijs when carrying out assigned tasking. A commo-
dore cited the example of a replenishment ship in his
squadron that routinely provided an extra measure of service
to the ships it was resupplying. The crew of this ship had
a reputation of being willing to work long into the night to
provide fuel and supplies to other ships in the sguadron.
Here was a ship that seemed to be saying "We're going to
'make it happen* no matter what it takes."
Ships that carry out assignments with flair impressed
the officers we interviewed. One commodore admired a
commanding officer who shot the ship's guns at every oppor-
tunity and steamed at flank speed when proceeding from one
commitment to the next. The commodore pointed to the posi-
tive impact this had on the crew, saying that "they loved
16
their commanding officer and would do anything for him."
Another commodore sighted the example of a commanding
officer who, during a routine transit, had shown a lot of
initiative ty conducting a drug raid on a fishing vessel
that was suspected cf transporting illegal drugs. The
operation was carried out without a hitch, despite the fact
that the commanding officer found it necessary to fire
warning shots across the bow of the fishing vessel before
the master would permit his vessel to be searched. Every
aspect of this operation was carried out flawlessly,
including keeping senior officers in the chain cf command
fully informed of the operation as it progressed. Such
excellent performance was considered typical of this ship.
B. SECCTING STRAIGHT WITH THE BOSS
The next indicator of excellence relates to the manner
in which the best ships communicate up the chain of command.
They seem to produce higher quality messages and reports
than fleet average ships. Not only are their messages
timely, clear, and concise but they don't raise more ques-
tions than they answer. Senior officers find it very frus-
trating when they have to dig through a message for five
minutes to pick out the main point.
It's clearly important to be candid when reporting
information to seniors. This means that the best ships
build credibility by not hesitating to report bad news along
with the good. As one officer put it, "They put their
marker down," meaning they let their boss know exactly where
they stand. Also, when reporting problems, they simultane-
ously discuss alternative solutions and then state which
alternative they intend to follow. Typical of senior
officer comments on this subject were those of a commodore
who noted that his best ships did a better job of keeping
17
him informed. Their messages reflected detailed planning.
Every report told what and why something had happened and
what action was being taken, when appropriate. The messages
pointed cat not only the symptoms but also the causes of
problems along with the action they were taking to resolve
the causes of the problems. Such thorough staffing by a
ship itade the commodore's and his staff's job easy, and this
impressed him.
Although one group commander felt that the best ships
tended to have fewer equipment casualty reports (CASREPTs)
than ether ships, virtually every senior officer thought the
best ships would usually have an average number of them.
Cne commodore's comments were fairly representative. He
said he gets a little suspicious if ships in his squadron
have unusually high or low numbers of CASREPTs. He wonders
if those with many CASREPTs are maintaining their eguipment
properly. Conversely, he wonders if those that have
submitted few or no CASREPTs are failing to report or are
aware of all their equipment deficiencies.
C. A1PHABET SOOP ON THE BRIDGE WING
We found that senior officers consider departmental
awards to be fairly good indicators of excellence. But
most don't think the test ships make winning these awards an
end in itself. Ratter, attainment of these awards appears
to be a fallout of having done other things right.
It was interesting listening to commodores describe how
they decided which ship in the squadron would be awarded the
battle efficiency (battle "E") award. We sensed they try
very hard to award the battle "E" to the best ship in the
squadron. Eut because many squadrons have two or more ships
which a commodore believes are worthy of the award, he is
sometimes forced to split hairs in choosing the recipient.
18
The consensus was that all battle "E" winners are excellent
ships, tut frequently there are one or two other ships in
the squadron that are just as excellent, if not more so, as
the battle "E" winner. Sometimes there are external factors
beyond a ship's control that might preclude it from winning
the battle "E".
How about the Gclden Anchor Award? With all the talk
about retention these days, we made a point of asking how
much emphasis senior officers place on retention ratings.
The answer is that to be perceived as a top performer, a
ship dcesn't have to have a high retention rate. An officer
would typically tell us that a good ship's retention rate
might be low because the commanding officer needed to
discharge a number cf sailors who should have never been
allowed in the Navy in the first place. However, an excel-
lent ship would not have consistently below average reten-
tion over an extended period of time.
D. FINISHING FOOT RACES
In general, the best ships get better results than ether
ships on inspections which require ship wide involvement,
such as Elanned Maintenance System (PMS) Inspection, Board
of Inspection and Survey (INSUEV) , Command Inspection,
Supply Management Inspection (SMI) , Nuclear Technical
Proficiency Inspection (NTPI) , and Operational Propulsion
Plant Exam (OPPE). Cf these, the OPPE is considered to be
by far the most important because of the complexity cf the
inspection. Another characteristic of the best ships is
that they avoid the need for last minute crisis inspection
preparations by staying in a state of constant inspection
readiness. They excel at both scheduled and surprise
inspections.
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Cne senior officer said that the type commander's atten-
tion is drawn to those ships that have either barely passed
a major inspection or passed it with exceptionally few
discrepancies. Doing exceptionally well on inspections does
a lot to build a ship's reputation as a top performer. In
contrast, those that fail or barely pass them can very
quickly gain a poor reputation. In the words of this
officer, "It's the guy who ends up $2000 short in his
disbursing audit whc really gets our attention." Cur
impression is that inspections are an indicator that can be
compared to a foot race. You're still in the race for
excellence if you pass all of the key inspections, but you
can put yourself on the sidelines for a relatively long time
if you fail just one.
E. TEEY FIX THEMSELVES
The lest ships are self-sufficient in the sense that
they do a superior job of maintaining and repairing their
equipment. For example, a rear admiral noted that the top
performing ships have officers and technicians who know how
to tell if their equipment is operating at peak efficiency.
He cited the example of non-excellent ships that have their
anti-sutnarine warfare (ASW) sonar streamed and don't even
know if it is operating up to design parameters. He thought
that letter ships detect and correct equipment degradations
much mere guickly than average ships.
A number of senior officers stressed that the best ships
only ask for technical assistance after all on board
resources have been exhausted. Then, if a technical expert
has occasion to visit the ship, the cognizant shipboard
technicians eagerly learn as much as they can from him about
how to naintain and repair their equipment. These ships
also know how to make the repair system work for them. A
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commodore noted that these ships don't assume they will see
results ty merely filling out a work request and submitting
it to an intermediate maintenance activity (IMA). Instead
they fellow up on the IMAs, closely monitoring the progress
cf repairs.
F. SOPPCRT FOR THE STAFF
Senior officers find that officers on the best ships
have gcod rapport with their squadron staffs. Staff offi-
cers find that their counterparts on these ships have fewer
problems and are generally less trouble to work with. In
short, the best ships make the staff's job easy. In
describing one of the finest ships that an officer was
familiar with, he said that she "had her act together, had a
game plan, and kept the staff informed." He mentioned that
this shif made a habit of passing information to the staff
such as the ship's family-gram, copies of "kudo" messages
they had received for jobs well done, and a description of
problems the ship was currently tackling.
Ancther mark of excellent ships is that they seek help
from their staff counterparts well in advance of scheduled
evolutions such as inspections. For example, one senior
officer said that if the best ships needed help in preparing
for an CPPE, they would ask for it as much as six months
ahead of time. They would not wait until two weeks before
the inspection to announce a myriad of deficiencies that
would require shipboard and staff personnel to go into a
crisis mode in order to correct them.
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IV. WATERFECNT INDICATORS OF EXCELLENCE
We continue to summarize our findings by presenting the
"waterfront indicators of excellence," namely those which
senior officers say they observe when they arrive aboard
excellent ships. The vast majority of senior officers
believe they can do a fairly accurate job of sizing uf the
overall guality of a ship within a relatively short time
after arriving aboard. Some added that on occasion they
subseguently decide that their initial evaluations are
incorrect. Sometimes they might think a ship is weak oily
to decide later that it is strong. Hardly ever do they
think a ship is strong and later find it weak. Some said
they would need several hours to a full day or more aboard
ship tc do a fair job of appraising it. Others said they
could do it within their first five to ten minutes on board.
None felt it would take an extended period of time. One
commodore explained his visit strategy. He spends twenty
minutes with the captain, takes a tour of the ship, meets
with the chiefs, lunches with the wardroom, and has a ques-
tion and answer session with the officers and chiefs. From
such a visit, he is able to formulate an impression of how
good the ship is. He added that there are times when he
changes his opinion of a ship after having an initial favor-
able or unfavorable impression, but this did not happen very
often.
A. CIEA1LINESS IS HEJT TO EXCELLENCE
If one message came through loud and clear from these
officers, it was that the best ships are also the cleanest
and the test looking topside and between decks. The sponge
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and the paint brush held positions of honor for the officers
we interviewed. The importance they place on ship cleanli-
ness would be difficult to overemphasize. Although they
have different reasons for emphasizing cleanliness, they all
think it goes hand in hand with top performance. For
example, a commodore said that cleanliness standards reflect
the quality of standards that will be set in other areas
such as preservation and maintenance. A rear admiral drove
home the importance of cleanliness when he said that of all
the top operational ships he had ever encountered, he could
only think cf one that was not extremely clean.
As trite as the expression "first impressions are
lasting impressions" nay be, it holds true for almost all
the officers we interviewed. Most of them start tuilding
their impression of a ship the moment they set foot on the
guarterdeck, which, on the best ships, is normally an
impressive looking area, manned by sharp looking and atten-
tive watchstander s. They continue to build upon their
impression cf the ship as they are escorted to and from
various spaces. A commodore, with forty years of naval
experience said he could tell what a ship is like by
walking froir the guarterdeck to the wardroom. He was dead
serious. Specifically, he sizes up the ship by its outward
appearance and the appearance of the quarterdeck area, the
passageways, and the mess specialist on duty in the
war drccm.
Speaking of the wardroom, a number of senior officers
indicated its appearance says a lot about the ship. Cne
commodore was especially impressed by the manner in which
one of his top ships had redone its wardroom to give it a
"pub type" atmosphere. The commodore felt this was innova-
tive and effective because, with such a fine wardroom, the
officers would be more likely to frequent it. This would
lead to a stronger sense of unity among the officers.
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Another commodore said he examined the wardroom for seme
tangitle evidence that officer qualifications were recog-
nized, such as a beard on the bulkhead with the names of
qualified surface warfare officers. Such trademarks tended
to shew up on excellent ships but not on others.
Puttinq forth the extra effort that reflects special
attention to detail in the appearance of shipboard spaces is
also a mark of excellence. In talkinq about one cf his
favorite ships, a commodore said he was most impressed not
only by the cleanliness of the engineering spaces, but also
ty the extra effort the engineers took to make their spaces
look sharp. Polishinq bright work was considered indicative
cf pride in their spaces. Another example that comes to
mind occurred just before we began an interview with an
embarked ccumodore. As the chief staff officer escorted us
from the quarterdeck to the commodore's office, he pointed
with adairation to the shininq decks and the wire brushed
runqs en one of the ladders we had to climb. There is no
doubt that senior officers really do notice when ships put
forth the extra effort to make their ship shine.
E. ITS MY SHIP!
The attitude displayed by shipboard personnel is consid-
ered a very important indication of excellence. On the best
ships virtually all hands have a positive view of them-
selves, their duties, their commandinq officer, and their
ship. Eut how do senior officers go about sizinq up a
crew's attitude? There are a variety of ways. One is to
listen to the line of thouqht runninq throuqh the questions
and ccmirents made ty shipboard personnel when they have
discussions with the senior officer. For example, a rear
admiral finds that on the best ships the atmosphere durinq
discussion sessions tends to be more conqenial and the
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subject matter more broad than that which he hears on other
ships. He doesn't hear a lot of people "grinding axes."
Other officers indicated that a positive crew attitude
is demonstrated by crewmen who don't look the other way or
avoid encounters with senior officers such as the ccmmcdore
when he appears on scene. Instead, they appear to enjoy
meeting the commodore and telling him about their gear and
their ship. One commodore said he gets a general impression
cf crew attitude by walking around a ship and noting how
crew members respond when he appears. A positive attitude
is exemplified by crew members and junior officers whc look
him straight in the eye as he passes. Poor attitude is
exemplified by those who avoid him.
An attitude of ownership tends to pervade the excellent
ships. Personnel at all levels of the command talk with
pride abcut "my ship," "my space," or "my job." On these
ships, you are more likely to hear a chief saying things
like "my MPA" rather than "the MPA" when referring to his
division officer.
Most senior officers also find that a professional,
businesslike attitude is a hallmark of excellence. Take the
underway bridge watch, for example. In stressing the impor-
tance of a formal and professional watch, a commodore asked,
"Does the officer of the deck say 'Hey Frank. Check the
starboard pelorus. ' or does he say 'Mr Smith! Check the
starboard pelorus!'" Other officers stressed that a profes-
sional attitude is manifested in the way day-to-day work is
undertaken. When visiting excellent ships, they can sense
that productive, purposeful work is in progress. By this
they meant that the best ships have officers a nd crewmen
that are hard at work during working hours, even if it's the
duty section on a Saturday in port, and they are working to
a plan.
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These officers read a lot from the chiefs 1 attitude. On
excellent ships, they see a positive attitude being
displayed by chief petty officers. The chiefs assume their
proper role, meaning they are very much involved in the
management of the ship. For example, a commodore mentioned
that en his best ships the chiefs were very visible in the
working spaces. He also noted that the chiefs, although
present, were not the ones doing the hands on work. Instead
they were supervising and instructing junior personnel.
Finally, crews cf excellent ships demonstrate a posi-
tive, "can do" attitude which is reflected in a greater
degree cf support for the command than usually fcund on
ships. One officer reflected on the most impressive exam-
ples of "can do," and he cited the example of an aircraft
carrier in which seventy six restrictive deficiencies were
identified during the first day of an Operational Propulsion
Plant Examination. This crew viewed the inspectors as their
enemy and there was no way they were going to be bested.
They worked through the night and by the time the inspection
team returned the next day, the crew had not only corrected
every one of the deficiencies, they also had identified and
corrected numerous other discrepancies that the inspection
party had not noticed. This kind of effort convinced the
commodore he was dealing with an unusually fine crew. A
commodore told us hew impressed he was with a ship in the
squadron that had been tasked on short notice with taking
over the deployment cf another ship which was experiencing
material problems. At first the commodore was concerned
that this tasking would have a devastating effect on the
morale of the crew which had returned recently from a six
nonth deployment. However, it didn't. Morale remained
high throughout the deployment and the ship performed in an
exemplary manner. This same ship also received a surprise
CPPE enrcute to the short notice deployment. Again the ship
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excelled, passing the inspection with flying colors. She
seemed to take everything in stride. All the commodore saw
from this ship was "can do," and it was not just the captain
who was a "can doer," it was also his crew. The commodore
was net certain why this ship had such a positive attitude,
but he was very impressed with what he saw. Sometimes
little things told senior officers a lot about a ship. A
commodcre described the attitude of the crew on one of his
very best ships. When inspectors detected a leaking valve
during an INSURV inspection, the petty officer with the
inspectors had the valve tagged immediately for repair. His
taking the initiative was in keeping with the actions of all
the ether personnel in this engineering department. The
crew seemed to be connitted to doing well not because of the
inspection, but because they had a broader "can do" attitude
that guided their routine, day-to-day actions.
C. ATTENTION TO KEY PLAYERS AND KEY RELATIONSHIPS
The relationship between the commanding officer and
executive officer is cne that senior officers think is very
important. However, there was little offered in the way of
advice as to what tc do when this relationship was not
strong. Excellent ships invariably have a commanding
officer and executive officer who relate well, trust each
other, and have sinilar leadership styles. One admiral
noted that in two of his four previous commands he and his
executive officer did not have a good relationship and the
command suffered as a result. Reflecting on the executive
officer's relationship with his subordinates, the admiral
added that the executive officer should never be the social
equal cf the department heads. There must be a barrier.
Discussing the importance of infusing trust into the
commanding officer/executive officer relationship, a
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commodore with forty years of naval experience said he was
particularly impressed by one commanding officer in the
squadron who had left his ship by helo one day, leaving the
executive officer to bring the ship to port so that he (the
commanding officer) could attend a meeting the commodore had
called for all commanding officers in the squadron. Both
the executive officer and the crew would know by such a bold
step that the commanding officer truly trusted his executive
officer.
A positive officer/chief petty officer relationship was
mentioned repeatedly as being a key indicator of excellence.
Cn the best ships, it is professional and respectful, but
not "buddy-buddy." The chiefs and officers have mutual
respect for each other and they work well together. Ihe
chiefs dcr.'t need or get a lot of "rudder orders" from the
officers because they (the chiefs) take the initiative and
plan and supervise their men's work. A commodore attributed
one of the reasons his ships performed well to the chiefs on
these ships who performed roles that were often performed by
officers in other ships. Furthermore, the chiefs were part
of the decision making process. This tended to get them
more involved in the running of their ships with the result
that their talents were more fully utilized.
Strong relationships on the best ships (such as between
the commanding officer and crew, the officers and crew, and
the commanding officer and officers) were also mentioned to
a lesser extent by senior officers as items they keyed on
when forcing an opinion of a ship. Unity and teamwork are
typically characteristic in each of these relationships on
excellent ships. One commodore called it "unit ictegrity,"
a term he used to describe a pervasive feeling on the best
ships wherein all individuals tend to feel they are an
important part of the command.
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V. THE TRIED AND TROE METHODS
Sc far, we have summarized what senior officers have
said abcut external and waterfront indications of excel-
lence. But how do they think the best ships are achieving
excellence? Do they perceive a recipe for success being
used by excellent ships? The senior officers we met were
struck by both the similarities and differences they saw
when they observed excellence in the Surface Navy. Styles
varied immensely, but there were certain basics associated
with excellence. These officers do not think there is any
one best leadership style ("You have to go with what got you
to your command"), ncr do they think innovative leadership
and management technigues are needed to operate a ship in an
excellent manner. As one commodore put it, "All you have
to do is do well those things that you have heard about all
of your career." A staff officer's views were similar when
he said, "A ship's ability to achieve excellence is based on
its ability to use the 'tried and true methods' of leader-
ship and management." But what are the tried and true
methods which these officers saw as most critical towards
achieving excellence? Some senior officers gave very
specific examples of management technigues which they are
convinced all excellent ships use. Others said they weren't
certain how the best ships were being managed, but they
offered up some of their opinions as to what they thought
was fundamental in achieving excellence. In this portion
of the paper we will summarize the management technigues,
methods, and strategies which these senior officers think
excellent ships are applying. As the reader will see, it
guickly becomes obvicus that they think excellence starts
with the captain.
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A. TEE CAPTAIN HAS A PHILOSOPHY
One point that was repeatedly emphasized during our
interviews was that commanding officers of the best ships
arrive on board with a "command philosophy" or a "game plan"
of leadership and management for achieving excellence. All
of the captains of the excellent ships the senior officers
dealt with in the present or the past had their ccmmand
philosophy fixed firmly in their minds prior to assuming
command. Some of these senior officers felt that not all
captains had well thought out command philosophies aimed at
excellence. One officer ccmmented that he was amazed to
find that officers he interviewed for command qualification
were freguertly unable to talk about their command philos-
ophy because they hadn't given it any thought.
No one command philosophy was thought to be the best.
But it was clear that the captain should have a plan to lead
and manage his ship and that he should be working continu-
ously at i iplementing it. A commodore, for example, felt it
was important that the captain have and promulgate his
command philosophy both in writing and at frequent meetings
with all levels of the chain of command. He suggested that
the captain discuss elements of his philosophy with depart-
ment heads at formal weekly meetings and with division offi-
cers and chiefs every other week. Having a philosophy was a
starting point on the road to excellence, and getting this
philosophy to every member of the crew was the next step.
Although they felt there is no one best way to lead,
several did state that a consistently autocratic style would
not lead to excellence. Such a style, it was felt, could
tring atout good short term performance but the ship's
performance would decline in the long run. A dictatorial
manner would eventually alienate a crew and without the
support cf the crew excellence could not be maintained.
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E. TKE CAPTAIN IS ODT AND ABOOT
If there is one thing senior officers said that
commanding officers of excellent ships avoid, it is staying
tied tc their stateroom. They think the best commanding
officers routinely get around their ships to observe what is
going en and keep in touch with the crew. Being out and
about is cne of the primary means effective commanding offi-
cers stay in tune with their crew. While making their
rounds, these commanding officers are not meddling in the
affairs cf their crew. Rather, primarily they are demon-
strating their irterest in what their crewmembers are doing.
A commodore, whose comments were typical, said he saw
commanding officers of excellent ships as being strong
leaders who were active and involved. They insure they
have a let of interaction with the ship's officers and men.
This high level of interaction hardly ever took on the trap-
pings of micro-management, however.
C. THESE ABE THE CAPTAIN'S STANDARDS
Senior officers feel very strongly that commanding offi-
cers of the best ships devote a lot of attention to and are
extremely effective at setting standards and goals and
communicating them to all hands.
In commenting on the importance of high standards in
general, a staff officer said the captain should "preach his
views on what he expects, regularly and continuously." The
chief staff officer of a tactical amphibious squadron said
he thought it was important that the captain communicate to
the crew his standards "using all forms of communication,"
and the message should be "these are my standards." A
commodore commented, "Tell them (the crew) what you want and
you will be surprised. They will give it to you." During
his previous ship command, he had gathered the crew
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immediately after assuming command and told them the ship
was the dirtiest he had ever seen and that he expected them
to clean it up immediately- They did. The commodore said,
"These guys just wanted to be told what to do." Another
commodore said that having high standards was one of the key
elements of shipboard leadership and management that set
excellent commands apart from the rest. On excellent ships,
he felt that the standards were higher across the board and
their attainment of standards was not viewed as something
that cculd te negotiated. Commanding officers of excellent
ships did not take it for granted that people know what he
expects of them. The captain must first tell them his
standards and then, if need be, demand that they be met. He
added that "The crew will do whatever you ask of them."
To achieve excellence, the link between standards and
accountability had tc be made known to every crewmember. In
discussing the enforcement of standards, a commodore said
that the captain "can't be a nice guy." When people do
something wrong, they have to be told, and this starts with
the captain pointing out errors when he sees them occur.
This was net to say that the chain of command should be
ignored, but it is important that the officers and men know
that subpar performance will be noted and action will be
taken to reuedy any below standard reoccurrence.
E- EVEBITHIHG IS POSEED DOINHIIL
Tasks are delegated to the maximum extent possible on
the best ships. A staff officer summed up most senior
officers 1 attitude towards delegation when he commented,
"Pushing things downhill should become a way of life." On a
typical excellent ship, delegation starts with the captain,
who realizes he cannot do everything. The captain goes out
of his way to let the executive officer make some of the
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decisions that are traditionally made by the commanding
officer. Such trust and delegation not only develops the
executive officer, but it also pervades other senior-
subordinate relationships from the department heads to the
mess cocks. The net result is that almost everyone is
growing professionally and becoming qualified for their next
at sea assignment.
E. THEY IGNORE THE BIGHT TBINGS
Senior officers stated repeatedly that the best ships
recognize their limitations and live within them. They
don't take on too much at one time nor do they try to do
things they aren't capable of doing. In other words, they
set priorities, have their subordinates do likewise, and act
in accordance with their established priorities. When a
commodore stated that the best ships work smarter not
harder, he attributed the attainment of this primarily to
the atility of these ships to plan and set proper priori-
ties. Another commodore said that his best captains knew
that they could not do everything that was required of them.
They demonstrated an the ability to "know what is really
important," and they were skilled at "selectively ignoring
the right things." A third commodore said that there are a
thousand things the commanding officer is responsible for,
but only a handful he needs to keep on his mind all the
time, examples being safety, CMS, disbursing, and nuclear
matters. Yet another commodore said that top ships realize
they cannot do everything. They make the effort to learn
what the commodore expects of the ship, and they give it to
him. They know what is important and have the ability to
prioritize their work.
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F. 1EEY HAVE "GOOD" DISCIPLINE
There was nothing surprising or unigue about what senior
officers' views on discipline. However, they all mentioned
the importance of discipline and stressed that it must be
firm, fair, consistent, and speedily administered. As one
staff officer put it, "Good ships have good discipline."
Many senior officers did mention that they think the best
ships try to reform problem sailors rather than just
discharge them from the Navy. For example, one officer said
he thought the best ships made an attempt to "turnaround"
poor performers before initiating separation procedures. He
did not think the top ships conducted massive house clean-
ings of poor performers.
G. CBIEFS ASSUME THEIR PROPER ROLE
We've already mentioned that senior officers we inter-
viewed find that, on excellent ships, the chief petty offi-
cers assume a greater role in the day-to-day management of
their ships than en most other ships. How does the
commanding officer get this high degree of commitment and
involvement from the chiefs? The answer lies in the
captain's actions aimed at elevating his chiefs to their
"rightful" position of leadership. One way he does this is
by going on record regarding his expectations of his chiefs.
He tells them he realizes the importance of their experience
and expertise, emphasizing that he expects them to be the
backbone of the ship's leadership and that he wants them to
be highly involved in all aspects of the ship's management.
Another way the captain does this is by making certain the
chiefs know he expects them to train junior officers, and by
making certain the junior officers know that he expects them
to work closely with their chiefs and to learn from them.
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H. TEE CREW KNOWS WHAT'S GOING ON
Senior officers said repeatedly that they think crews of
the test ships are kept well informed of a broad range of
information concerning their ship. This included not only
heing made aware of scheduled ship events, but also events
impacting on the ship, and feedback from the captain en how
well he thought the ship was doing. Excellent ships have
excellent communications, and they don't assume that all
that needs to be done to communicate effectively is to put
the word out at officer's call and in the plan of the day.
The key to excellent communications is the captain. He
keeps the crew informed by using the ship's public
announcing system (1MC), holding periodic meetings such as
captain's call with t and most importantly by talking to
individuals one-on-one during his daily tours of the ship.
A staff officer's comments on this subject were typical.
He considered communication with the crew to be very impor-
tant and stressed that the captain should personally talk to
the crew regularly. This not only helped get the word out
but it also also had the secondary positive effect of
allowing the crew to get to know the captain. A commodore
said that keeping the crew informed on "how they are doing"
was one of the captain's primary responsibilities and was
key to having an effective command. He added that he
thought it imperative that the commanding officer hold meet-
ings with the crew on a regular basis.
I. TBEY CARE FOB THEIR PEOPLE
The importance of concern for the individual sailor was
given much emphasis during the interviews and we heard many
examples of ways in which this concern is demonstrated on
excellent ships. One commodore stated he had concluded that
excellent leaders were "tuned to people and their needs,"
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and they were "in frequency and in harmony with the ship."
The commodore implied that caring for people and being in
touch with them were means needed to gain commitment of
individual sailors to the goals of their command.
An officer described how concern for sailors was demon-
strated on one of the better ships with which he was
familiar. It was standard procedure that a new man's rack
be made up and his name stenciled on both his rack and his
locker before he was taken to his berthing compartment for
the first time. This relatively insignificant act was felt
to have a powerful impact on both newly reporting sailors
and old hands. Among other things, it symbolized the
command's concern for its personnel. Coupled with other
acts aimed at demonstrating concern for the welfare of the
crew, this ship had developed a highly committed crew.
Another hallmark of excellence is that the captain plays
a major role in shewing concern for people. One of the
primary ways he does this is by recognizing good perform-
ance. In commenting on the best ship in his group, a group
commander noted it had an exceptionally strong education
program and many of her sailors received their high school
diplomas while assigned to the ship. The captain of this
ship went out of his way to recognize the accomplishments of
his crew. He invited the commodore and other VIPs to award
high school diplomas and to acknowledge other achievements.
This appeared to have a very positive impact on the crew and
was reflected in their extremely positive attitude.
In discussing ancther excellent ship, a commodore speke
very highly of the emphasis the commanding officer placed on
recognizing those who had successfully completed their
Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist qualification. Gaining
the silver cutlasses meant a lot to both the recipients and
the captain. The commanding officer made it a point to pin
the silver cutlasses to his uniform on the day prior to a
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formal ceremony at which the insignia was awarded. He did
this to show every man in the crew that this accomplishment
meant a lot to the captain. The commodore was very favor-
ably impressed by the extra effort the captain had made to
recognize the crew in this manner.
Excellent captains also are seen as showing concern for
individuals by being fair, firm, and consistent in adminis-
tering discipline. One commodore stated that when a man
went to mast, it was important that his entire chain of
command attend the mast and be prepared to provide frank and
candid comments on the man's performance. The commodcre
stated that when he had command of a ship, he weighed the
comments of the chain of command very carefully and was
inclined to give a man a break when the man's superiors so
recommended because of prior good performance.
Alternatively, he would "hammer" an offender for a similar
infraction when the chain cf command indicated that he was
not a gocd performer. This was a means he used as
commanding officer to let the crew know that he would take
care of the good personnel but would not put up with those
who did cot support the ship.
J. TBEY PLAH AHEAD
The ability to lcck ahead, to develop a plan, and then
to inplement the plan was emphasized time and again by the
officers we interviewed as a key to being an excellent ship.
They believe the best ships prepare today for events that
will take place months in the future. Rather than coming up
with elaborate schemes for planning, excellent ships empha-
size that planning shculd be done in a simple and straight-
forward manner. One commodore summed it up when he said
that the best ships plan to achieve that which they want.
He added that this was one way they work smarter, not
harder.
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Inspections were the primary area in which senior offi-
cers said gcod planning manifests itself. One officer said
he believed that excellent ships did a much better job of
planning and preparing for inspections. He noted that he
never seemed to find poor inspection results on ships that
had a con landing officer and department heads who had taken
the time to meet with his inspection party personnel a
couple of months before the inspection.
K. TEEIE PROGRAMS AEE BETTEE ACROSS THE BOARD
It was evident that the officers we interviewed think
that excellent ships do a better job of managing shipboard
programs than fleet average ships. As one commodore put it,
"The programs of excellent ships are better across the
board." Although all programs were considered important,
zone inspections, Planned Maintenance System, Enlisted
Surface Warfare Specialist qualifications, "I"
(Indoctrination) Division, and the Ombudsman program were
mentioned most frequently.
In providing an example of how an effective equipment
maintenance program improves the outcome of materiel inspec-
tions, a staff officer, who had previously been assigned as
a materiel inspector, said he found that ships with aviator
commanding officers tended to perform better on materiel
inspections than those with surface warfare commanding offi-
cers who did not have previous engineering experience. He
attributed this to the fact that the aviators have a built
in respect for the Planned Maintenance System and that they
saw the Engineering Operating Sequencing System (EOSS) as




I. CM TC TEE SHIPS
There you have it.. ..the "tried and true methods" which
senior officers mentioned most often when discussing "excel-
lence in the Surface Navy. " Combined with the "external"
and "waterfront" indicators of excellence, one can gain an
appreciation of how these senior officers judge their ships,
and how they believe their top ships go about achieving
excellence. Let us now go aboard six ships that these
senior officers singled out for their excellence and see if
there are any surprises.
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VI. ON £ HE DECK PLATES
Battle "E" winner, Marjorie Sterrett winner, Arleigh
Burke winner, OPPE standout, top operator, inspection
standout, high retainer, high morale, a captain who thinks
the wcrld of his crew and a crew that feels the same about
their captain, chiefs running the ship and the officers
managing their divisions and departments while growing
professicnally
,
pride in being not only the fightingest ship
on the waterfront but also the cleanest. Seem the like the
test of all worlds? Well, perhaps to the surprise of some,
there are ships out there that have much of this lock about
them.
For our study of excellence in the Surface Navy, we
wanted tc interview a wide variety of senior surface force
officers and to observe a diverse group of excellent surface
force ships. Our interviews with senior officers included
(1) amphibious and cruiser-destroyer group commanders, (2)
amphibious, service force, and cruiser-destroyer squadron
commanders, and (3) captains on the Atlantic and Pacific
Surface Force type commands. Because of ship operating
schedules we were unable to get as broad a range of surface
force ships as we desired. However, we did end up with five
different types of ships. Originally we selected the
following ships to visit: two cruisers, one destroyer, two
frigates, one amphibious transport dock, one amphibious
assault ship, and one salvage ship. In selecting ships to
interview, we used the following criteria: the number of
officers recommending a given ship as excellent; the
strength of the views of the senior officers recommending a
specific ship; and the availability of the ship for cur
interviews. All of the ships selected were recommended by
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at least twenty five percent of the senior officers we
interviewed and some by over ninety percent. There were
several ships strongly recommended for our project which
could not te observed because of their being deployed. We
conducted day long interviews on the eight ships that met
our criteria. Subsequent to our interviews, we decided to
drop two ships from our analysis, one frigate and the
amphibious assault ship, because we concluded that we were
not atle to get adequate information from these ships.
We went aboard each ship at 0900 and conducted one hour
individual interviews with the captain and the executive
officer. Then we conducted one hour interviews with each of
the following groups: two department heads, two to four
divisicn officers, four to twenty chiefs, ten to twenty E5's
and E6's, and ten to twenty E4's and below. 1 During the
interviews we were attempting to identify what each ship did
that made it perform well, why the ship performed better
than others, and how the ship went about conducting its
business. However, we did not want to do this in such a way
that our questions drove the answers, that is, we avoided
guestions that could be answered with a simple yes or no.
We did r.ot ask questions like "Is retention important on
this ship?" Instead we asked open ended questions, ques-
tions that usually began with the words "what" and "how"
with scire "why" questions added after receiving answers to
the "what" and "how" questions. For example, we would ask
everyone we interviewed, "To what do you attribute the
success of this ship?" and "How would you compare your
ship's performance to the other ships in your squadron/
hoaepcrt?" And after we got an answer we might add "Why do
you think your ship is the best in the squadron?"
iSumnaries of all of our senior officer and ship inter-
views are on file at the Naval Postgraduate School.
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In addition to using the IS model (see the introduction
to Part I for details of this model) to develop our ques-
tions, we also included questions relating to those catego-
ries senior officers discussed the most when we asked them
for their views on excellence in the Surface Navy. These
categories were departmental and battle efficiency awards,
cleanliness/appearance of ship, appearance of crew, attitude
of crew, role of captain, role of chiefs, commanding
officer/executive officer relationship, retention, disci-
pline, communications, task accomplishment, inspections,
innovation, self-sufficiency, programs, and personnel.
Having completed our ship interviews, we needed to
decide upon a method for providing the reader with our find-
ings. When we started, we had hoped that we would be able
to group the information in cne or more of the currently
popular models used to describe organizations, such as the
7S mertioned earlier; however, we found that such an
approach, although appealing for its simplicity and neat-
ness, tended tc reircve from our analysis the energy and
personalities of the ships we visited, and it was these
gualities that had impressed us the most. Therefore, we
elected a less structured but, we hope, more interesting and
enlightening approach to telling the story of these excel-
lent ships. We chose to identify those qualities that the
people on these ships felt contributed the most to their
success.
After many false starts, the attributes that we ended up
with as the best descriptors of these excellent ships were
grouped into the following categories, each of which is
amplified in the chapters that follow.
- Good ships getting better
- Pride in evidence at all levels
- Teamwork, not just a concept but a way of life
- The ship in automatic
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- High energy level/bias towards action
- Presence of a common vision and shared values
- As the captain, so is the ship
- Sailers, our mest important resource
- Oh yes, task accomplishment 2
The story we want to tell is about excellent ships that
in the past were good but are on their way to becoming
great; ships that have crews that think of themselves as
family and take great pride in themselves and their shits;
ships that are well managed, possessing many of the quali-
ties extolled in present day leadership and management
literature, even though people are not sure why these attri-
butes exist in their ship a rd not in others they have served
in or known about; ships that know one thing for sure, their
captain is the key to the success of their ship, not because
he is so smart or works so hard but because he understands
people and, to quote a frequently heard phrase, "because he
acts like a human being"; and ships that view their success
at getting the j cb dene as almost an after thought, "We just
2 Feters and Waterman in their book, In Search of
Excellence, use the following descriptive pErases t"o
describe the basics of success they saw working in the
excellent American business they studied: managing ambiguity
and paradox, a bias for action, close to the customer,
autonomy and entrepreneursh ip, productivity through pecple,hands-on/value-driven, stick to the knitting- and simple
form/lean staff. Peters and Waterman's work provided us
with the idea to attempt our study of excellence in the
Surface Navy, and much of what they described as being at
work in the successful American business also was observed
by us on the decks and between the bulkheads of excellent
O.S. Navy ships. Obviously, because of the different envi-
ronments of business and defense, there were a lot of
differences in the dynamics of ships as opposed to those in
businesses; however, we were struck more by the similarities
in our observations than the differences. Two of Peters and
Waterman's attributes, a bias for action and productivity
through people, were right on target with our observations,
and we have used very similar descriptive phrases in our
paper, high energy level/bias towards action and sailors -
cur most important resource. We commend the reading cf In
Search of Excellence to Navy leaders and managers. It is
relevacT^tc our profession. [Eef. 1]
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try to excel at everything we do, and the tasks take care of
themselves.
"
flith one more repetition of the caveat that this is not
cur theory on how to achieve excellence in Navy ships, but
just our description cf what we saw on six ships that senior
officers identified as being excellent, let us now go aboard
and take a look at excellence in the Surface Navy.
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VII. GCOD SHIPS GETTING BETTER
According to the officers and enlisted personnel we
interviewed, none cf the ships we visited had made what
might te called a miraculous turnaround in the recent past.
That is, none of the ships had gone from "basket case" to
top performer. Each of these ships had been at least
average in the recent past (18 months to two years before
the interview) , and most of these ships had been top ships
for several years, at a minimum. It was interesting to note
how many of the senior enlisted personnel attributed the
success of their ship to the fact that "Our ship has always
teen top notch, since the day she was commissioned."
However, even though the ships were seen as having been good
in the past, everyone we talked with thought the ships were
on an upward performance trend. They saw their ship as
being better today than a year ago, and they felt that the
ship would be even tetter in the immediate future. The
collective feeling cf being on an upward performance trend
even applied to a ship that a year before had won the
Eattenberg Trophy, fcr being the top ship in the fleet. The
crew members who had teen in this ship during the period it
won the Battenberg Trophy stated that their winning the
award was well deserved, but they were quick to add that
they were a better ship today than when they had been recog-
nized as being the best. Although there was no doubt in the
minds of the people on these ships that they were supers-
tars, it was interesting to observe that many personnel,
especially the junior officers and junior enlisted men, did
not have strong opinions as to why their ship was so good
and getting better, they just knew that it was.
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Occasionally we would hear a negative comment about a
specific aspect of the management of one of these ships
(they were excellent ships, not perfect) , but what impressed
us was that people noting a problem were usually optimistic
about the chances of the stated problem being corrected. If
an officer commented that the ship did not have as good a
Surface Warfare Officer (S WO) or Enlisted Surface Warfare
Specialist (ESWS) program as he thought it should have, he
would usually follow up with a comment that the problem with
the program was appreciated and action was being taken to
rectify the situation.
We freguently heard, especially when talking to the
chiefs, that their ship's top performing reputation drew
good people to the command like a powerful magnet, making
teing a good ship getting better a little easier to achieve
than one might think. We met several chiefs and first and
second class petty officers who told us that they had
lobbied to get orders to their ship because they had wanted
to be on a ship with a great reputation. We also met one
commanding officer who said that he attempted, on occasion,
to recruit top senior enlisted personnel to his ship, and he
found this was not difficult to do because of the ship*s
fine reputation. To this captain, the appeal of being on a
winner was very strong, especially for junior officers and
junior erlisted personnel. He noted that young men did not
join the Navy to be average. As he put it, to these young
men "Being average stinks! They want to stick out." 3eing
en a top ship gave them the chance to stand out from the
herd .
Another benefit of being good which made remaining on
top a little easier was that the commodores, group
commanders, and their staffs tended to leave these ships
alone. In general, the officers and enlisted personnel were
neutral regarding the staff. The few who did have opinions
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of the staffs usually had good words for them. The staff
was net seen as the enemy, but more like a distant rich
uncle who cculd be of help when needed and who did not stick
his nose where it was not needed. Two of the ships we
interviewed spent a lot of time serving as flag ships.
Obviously, they had a close relationship with the staff.
However, their attitude towards the staff was still posi-
tive. Ihis had not happened automatically, but it had
happened.
Much of what follows in the next eight chapters gets
into the how and the why these ships were good and getting
better. But before moving on, it is worth noting that when
we asked people on these ships how good were they, the
answer was invariably, "We are the best." However, when we
asked them why they were good or what it was that they did
that made them good, the answers covered the waterfront, and
sometimes the answer was not known, especially among the
junior officers and junior enlisted personnel. However,
when we departed each of these ships, having spent six hours
on them talking with personnel at all levels of the chain of
command, we felt that we had some good ideas regarding the
causes of their success. Read on if you are interested in
the look of excellence and some of its causes.
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VIII. PRIDE IN EVIDENCE AT ALL LEVELS
The amount of pride the officers and men of these ships
had in their ships was truly amazing. Nearly everyone,
officer and enlisted, felt that his ship was the best, and
they were proud and anxious to tell us that this was the way
they felt. When asked how they saw themselves relative to
the other ships in their squadron, the people we inter-
viewed, especially the chiefs and junior enlisted personnel,
typically would get en the front of their seats and proclaim
"There is nc doutt about it. We are the best ship in the
squadron!" Over and over again we heard junior enlisted,
senior enlisted, and officers saying things like "If there
is a war tomorrow, this is the ship I want to be on," or
"There is not another ship in my homeport that I would
rather be on." On two of these ships, we interviewed
approximately fifty officers and enlisted personnel, and we
did net come across a single person who did not think that
his ship was not only the best one in the fleet but also the
best one with which he had ever come in contact. The eld
refrain that the best command is either the one you just
came from or the one you are going to was not the case for
these officers and enlisted men. To these men, they had
found the best command, and we were standing on it. The
comments of the chiefs regarding the relative excellence of
their present command and their previous commands was espe-
cially telling, for the chiefs had numerous ships to compare
their present one against. But, even with the chiefs, their
conclusion was the same as that of the boot junior officers
or seamen, "This is the best ship." 3
3 In the introduction to the third edition of Command at
Sea, AdEiral John £. McCain, Jr. stated tha£ ""PfideJ
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The captains were also prcud of their ships, although
their pride was a lot more reserved and tempered with
rational explanations of how their ship achieved its
outstanding performance. The captains 1 pride often seemed a
very personal thing, similar to the pride seen in a parent
describing a highly successful son or daughter. Seme of the
captains were excited about the prospect of letting us know
how they operated, and others were rather restrained, but
all of them did feel that we had come to the right place to
study excellence in the Surface Navy.
A. TEE EOWER OF RECCGBIZIHG GOOD PERFORMANCE
Why were the people on these ships so proud of their
ship and their membership in the crew? Was enhancing crew
pride a gcal of these commands? If so, how was increased
pride achieved? We asked these questions a lot, and we
concluded that although pride had a lot to do with passing
inspections and meeting operational commitments, there was
more to it. Simple, garden variety recognition of good
performance probably had more to do with the pride observed
on these ships than any other management or leadership tech-
nique. Although usually not a stated goal of the commanding
officers, recogniticE of good performance was used on these
ships as a means of empowering subordinates and gaining
their coirmitment to command goals. On one ship, the CO
would give a dinner party on board the ship for new
personnel and their families. Before the dinner, he would
learn something about each new man in attendance, and at the
dinner he would introduce each new man to the people at the
table, making sure that his remarks contained a persoEal
loyalty, and discipline are the by-products stemming from
the proper exercise of command leadership." What we saw in
these excellent ships only lends support to his statement.
Pride is mentioned here, and as the reader will discover,
discipline and loyalty flourished on these ships. [Ref. 2]
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touch. The executive officer who related this t o us noted
that he could see that the people attending the dinner truly
appreciated the fact that they were being welcomed in such a
unique manner and that they were being recognized as impor-
tant individuals by the captain. They invariably felt good
about themselves and their new home. On another ship, the
captain went out of his way to insure that his crew received
recognition as a group and as individuals. After a lot of
politicing, he was able to arrange for his sailor of the
guarter to he recognized not only by himself but alsc by a
nearby Navy League. The sailer of the guarter and his wife
were treated to an expense free weekend at a plush resort
compliments of this Navy League chapter. The captain noted
that not only was this sailor of the guarter impressed and
motivated by the recognition, attention, and treatment he
received, but the rest of the crew appreciated what was
heing done for one of their own. They were proud to be on a
ship where individual excellence received this type of
special recognition.
B. ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE
Accentuating the positive was a powerful theme observed
en many of these ships. One captain went as far as to tell
his officers and chiefs that for every man who was disci-
plined, at least ten would be commended. This was not used
as an inflexible rule that sent the executive officer out
after every captain's mast looking for "good guys" to
fulfill a ten to one rule, rather it was made part of the
command climate on this ship. The officers and senior
enlisted personnel had been converted to the captain's way
of thinking. They gave recognition and recommended
personnel for command recognition, not because cf seme
dictum frcm on high, but because they had seen how powerful
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a motivator recognition of good performance could be, and
they wanted to use it to spur their personnel to even
greater comnitment and accomplishment. An officer on this
ship proudly related the ten to one rule to us as requiring
thirty commendations for every reprimand. Apparently he had
not only internalized his captain's thinking, he had
expanded upcn it.
Cn the majority of these ships, it was evident that the
sequence of getting tasks done started first with gaining
individual commitment to the general goals and processes of
the command. Once commitment was achieved, accomplishment
invariably followed. There was one ship in the group that
downplayed the importance of focusing on enhancing commit-
ment. Cn this ship, commitment was treated as a given and
when it was lacking it was achieved through edict. "You
just have to demand that people do their job" was the way
several officers put it. But, even on this ship, recogni-
tion of good performance occurred a lot.
These ships cultivated pride as a farmer might cultivate
his crops, and reccgnitioc of good performance was cne of
the key ingredients used to raise an individual's image of
himself and his ship. "When we do a good job, we get told
that we have done well," and statements similar to this were
heard repeatedly on these ships, especially, but not exclu-
sively, at the junior enlisted level. Although recognition
of superior performance was used a lot on these ships, the
crews felt that the recognition they received was hard
earned and well deserved, and not given out just to try and
squeeze a little more work out of a person. There seemed to
be a fine line between giving recognition when it was due,
and giving it unselectively and excessively. On one ship,
we heard the comment several times that a previous
commanding officer had given more recognition than the
present captain, but the recognition from the incumbent
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captain did more to motivate the crew because they realized
that when this captain recognized someone, it was well
deserved.
Recognition was net the sole purview of the captain on
these ships. It was used by many levels. The chiefs, in
general, seemed concerned especially with recognizing their
subordinates when they performed well. On one ship, for
example, when VIPs would visit the extremely impressive
firercoms, the chief in charge made certain that his
personnel appreciated the fact that they were being given a
compliment for their efforts just by the fact that the VIPs
were there. Additionally, this chief stated that he went
out of his way to recognize his personnel when tbey
performed well, which meant that he spent a lot of time
giving a lot of recognition.
In addition to verbal recognition, many of the chiefs we
met used more tangible forms of recognition, mainly the
granting of time off for jobs well done. On most of these
ships, the chiefs controlled liberty, which gave them the
power to tack up theii words of praise with action. (Even
en excellent ships, the sailors like their liberty.)
Furthermore, on these ships, the sailors saw the linkage
between effort expended and reward, e.g., liberty, medals,
and letters of cemmendation . Talking to a WU bosun on one
of the ships we visited, we heard that relatively late in
his professional life he learned the importance and power of
recognizing good performance. Whereas in the past he might
not have recognized a job well done because he thought
everyone was expected to perform well, he now took the time
to give recognition. He said that his change of views
regarding recognition resulted from his realizing how good
he felt in his last job wheD he was commended for doing
well. This happened a lot in his previous job (getting
commended and feeling good because of it) , and he said that
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it spurred him on to even better performance. He nov» saw it
as his duty to recognize his subordinates' good performance.
For example / after a recent long and difficult deck evolu-
tion, the first thing he did after securing was to go telow
and draft letters of commendation for his subordinates who
had performed in an exemplary manner during the evolution.
Talking with men from all levels of the chain of command on
this ship and with nen from all the ships we visited, we
were struck by the impact recognition of good performance
had had on them. Even though they felt they were the test,
they still were motivated by hearing from their superiors
that their efforts were known and appreciated.
Another aspect of recognition that manifested itself on
these ships was that the recognition tended to be done imme-
diately or very soon after the act that warranted the recog-
nition. Monthly awards ceremonies were held on these ships,
tut initial recognition was not delayed until the ceremony.
The captain would get on the 1 MC and let the crew know what
Petty Officer Jones did the moment his accomplishments were
appreciated. 4
Elanchard in his best selling book. The One M inut e
Mana ger, emphasizes the importance of icTent ifying an3
recognizing good performance. He considers recognition,
"one minute praising" is his more descriptive phrase, as one
of the members of a triad for effective management at the
working level. The other two members of the triad are "one
minute reprimanding" and "one minute goal setting."
[Ref. 3]
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IX. TEAMWORK NOT JOST A CONCEPT BOT A WAY OF LIFE
A. IITTIE THINGS MEAN A LOT
Although usually cot an expressed goal of the captain or
the officers and chiefs of these excellent ships, teamwork
was pervasive on all of these ships, especially among the
chiefs, the department heads and the junior enlisted
personnel. We repeatedly heard comments similar to one E5
saying, "If I need seme help, I can go right to the person
who is responsible, and nine out of ten times he will stop
what he is doing and help me out."
Cn another ship, we heard at every level of the command
that teamwork was outstanding on the ship, and that every
major evolution was approached as a team effort. The term
these officers and men used for their form of teamwork was
"group grabble." This meant to them that whenever there was
a big jot for the ship to do everyone was expected to do his
part. When the ship had a major seamanship evolution that
required people to help out with pulling cables and
providing their brawn, everyone turned out without the khaki
ever having to resort to the chain of command. People just
felt that it was their responsibility to lend a hand. When
this same ship had her OPPE, tiger teams of non-engineering
department personnel were formed and stationed on the mess
decks to respond in any way they could. Again, they were
willing to help out their shipmates. If that meant that a
radioman went into the bilges to clean an oil spill during
the OPPE, so be it. Cn another ship we visited, the depart-
ment heads recollected a recent evolution that to them
personified the crew's attitude towards teamwork. The ship
had just returned frcii a month at sea on a Friday afternoon,
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and a twenty man working party was required to load stores.
The department heads were concerned that it would be diffi-
cult to get personnel for the evolution since everyone not
in the duty section would want to hit the beach. To their
surprise, they ended up with twice as many people as were
needed for the evolution, and the attitude of the crew was
"Let's all pitch in and get this over so that everyone can
hit the beach." As the department heads watched this evolu-
tion, it dawned on them that the team spirit they were
witnessing was really what separated this ship from others
in which they had served, and it was this sense of family
that, perhaps more than any other factor, caused this ship
to be the best ship with which they had ever been
associated.
Supporting our impression of the importance and power of
the sense of teamwork on some of these ships was the
frequency with which we heard personnel from one department
offer unsolicited praise of personnel from a different
department. This happened with the department heads, the
division officers, the chiefs, the first class, and the
junior enlisted. Frequently the supply departments on these
ships were cited by engineers, operators, and weaponeers for
the outstanding service they provided in such things as
supply support and crew care, e.g., cooking and laundry
services. The supply officers on all of these ships were
held in high esteem by their fellow department heads. There
were a let of blue E's on these ships, but when asked to
describe the supply officer, we heard comments like, "He
stresses service to the ship far ahead of doing whatever it
takes to please supply inspectors and win supply E*s." On
one ship, a hero of the crew was a mess specialist (MS) who
had served en the ship for over ten years. He was something
of a folk hero. when underway, he worked around the clock.
The crew saw him as being driven by a desire to provide the
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crew the best food and service possible. People laughed and
shook their heads in agreement and amazement as one sailor
told us that this MS did not even have a bunk. He just
worked until he dropped, and wherever that was he rested
until he was ready tc work some more. His sacrifice and
dedication did a lot to motivate others on this ship tc give
extra of themselves and to draw other crew members into the
powerful sezse of family that existed in this ship.
In addition to having a high opinion of their shipmates
in general, the personnel on these ships respected and
trusted their shipmates. When asked if there was much theft
or vandalism on their ship, the sailors made statements that
indicated they were unfamiliar with what other ships in the
fleet are like. The younger sailors of these ships had
difficulty believing that there are ships that have problems
with theft and vandalism. Families did not inflict such
pains en themselves.
Perhaps these examples were not that atypical of those
found on fleet average ships, but what impressed us about
these stories was the fact that they meant something special
to the people on these ships. They served as examples of
the way these ships did business, not as one of occurrences
that left people wondering what got into the crew. The air
of teamwork that permeated these ships seemed to take on
almost mistical proportions. People enjoyed and appreciated
the fact that on this ship the level of cooperation and
teamwork was something special, and they wanted to do their
part to make this positive guality a permanent part of the
command fabric. They were not inclined to sit back and just
take advantage of the sense of teamwork that did exist, they
wanted tc contribute to this positive atmosphere and pass it
en to future crew memters.
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B. IT STARTS WITH OHE-ON-ONE RELATIONSHIPS
One-on-cne personal relations on these ships also showed
evidence of the importance of teamwork and cooperation to
overall performance. For example, we did not come across a
single example of one department head not getting along with
one of his peers. At first we thought we might be getting
"fed a line" when the department heads told us of how well
they got along with each other, but, as we talked to other
officers and enlisted personnel, we heard unsolicited
comments atout the close cooperation and rapport that
existed between the department heads and what a positive
impact this had on their command. Somehow, these department
heads had dealt successfully with the issue of career compe-
tition with their peers. Also, all of these captains felt
that they got along well with their executive officers, and
the executive officers felt just as positive about their
relations with their captains. The captain and the execu-
tive officer were not necessarily the best of friends, but
there was a mutual respect between these officers.
Furthermore, when the captain and the executive officer of
these ships had problems with their officers and enlisted
personnel, the general feeling among subordinates was that
the problems were dealt with in a professional and non-
personal manner. Actions, not personalities, tended to be
the fccus of criticise.
The junior enlisted were especially impressed by the
amount of cooperation that existed on their ships. They
usually said that they did not know why everyone tended to
cooperate, but they added that they were convinced that the
high level cf cooperation was a major, if not the major,
contributor to the success of the ship. The teamwork that
did exist seemed to cut across peer and working groups. The
officers got along well with the chiefs, the chiefs thought
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highly of the officers, the junior enlisted thought that
their IPCs were good, etc., etc. As one E3 put it, on his
ship there was no prejudice. He was not talking about race
prejudice; he was talking about prejudice towards junior
personnel by senior personnel. On his ship, as he saw it,
his feelings were treated as if they were important, just as
important as those of his superiors. This sailor was mess
cooking at the time we interviewed him, and he had no
nisccnceptions about who ran the ship and who made the deci-
sions. He knew that this was the responsibility of his
seniors, but he was impressed by the fact that the people
who had the responsibility for running the ship also had
the ability to appreciate that his feelings were just as
important to him as theirs were to them. When this sailor
was making his point he was in a group of fifteen E4's and
E3 f s, and, to a man, they nodded in agreement as the sailor
spoke. As we interviewed these young sailors, the command
master chief sat off to one side unobtrusively listening to
what we were being tcld. We could tell that he was proud of
what was being said. He had let us know before the group
interview that the ship was good and that the crew was
turned on; yet, we could tell that every time he saw the
manifestations of ccnmitment and cooperation from the crew
he got a warm feeling in the pit of his stomach. We were
impressed also.
C. TEAM AT THE TOP
On many of these ships the collaboration between the
department heads, division officers, and chiefs with the
captain was very strcng. Rather than operating as distinct
camps with similar goals of excellence, these groups and
individuals worked as an entity, as a team, with the captain
in charge, but also with the captain seen as a member of the
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team. The captain was perceived as being sharp and profes-
sional and in some cases extremely knowledgeable, but, more
importantly to his subordinates, he was also perceived as
being approachable and open to suggestions. Furthermore,
the captain was viewed as willing to change his mind when
one of the other team members had a better way of
approaching a problem. The officers and chiefs on these
ships responded very positively to their captain's being
approachable. They were not familiar with the captain, but
they were eager to share their views with him. On these
ships, with one exception, the captain did not do anything
that he considered out of the ordinary to develop this sense
of teamwork at the top, but upon reflection most of the
captains did note that they had let it be known that they
did net want to be surrounded by a bunch of "yes men," and
they scmehow were atle to convince their subordinates that
they were sincere regarding this pronouncement.
On one of the shijs, however, the captain took a very
proactive approach tc developing teamwork among the khaki.
He tcld us proudly that he could not stand "yes men" and to
get this point across to his officers and chiefs he periodi-
cally would make statements that were diametrically opposed
to his true beliefs just to see if the officers and chiefs
would call him on these bogus remarks. If they did not, he
would give them both barrels, and chastise them for not
having the confidence and energy to note the folly of what
he was saying. This captain added that it was very easy as
a captain to fall into the trap of believing you are always
right and to start thinking too much of your own ability and
opinions. He felt that he had to be constantly on his guard
against deceiving hinself, and that he had to convince his
subordinates through his words and actions that it was
important for him and the ship that he not be allowed to
live in a fool's paradise. The honest inputs of everyone
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were considered crucial in the guest for excellence, not the
dishonest agreeing "aye, aye, sirs" of subordinates afraid
and/or unwilling to tell the captain when he was heading in
the wrong direction. That is not to say that a form of
participative management existed in this ship that had every
man telling his superiors his every feeling about every
decision. It did not. Yet, the prevailing feeling was that
on matters of importance juniors could and were expected to
offer opinions at odds with their superiors without being
considered disloyal. Such opinions were not given with
great frequency, but the fact that the juniors knew that
they could te given meant a lot to these people and enhanced
their feeling of attachment to their ship.
D. FCE SHE NON-TEAM ELAYEB, STRIKE TWO, YOU 1 RE OUT
As mentioned earlier in this section, teamwork was
usually not seen as an end in itself or even as a command
goal, but on one ship, the captain elevated teamwork tc very
near the tcf of his priority list within the first week of
his joining. He gathered the crew together on the flight
deck for his first of many captain's calls, and he told them
something like this. The ship was not the best shif in the
squadron, but it could be and would be. He told them that
to be the best was not hard; all it took was commitment to
be the best and some hard work. He added that if they gave
him what he asked, the ship would become the best ship in
the fleet, adding that although this would require a lot of
hard work, it would be a lot of fun and very rewarding.
After he gave this speech, the commanding officer told the
crew trat he only wanted people on board who were committed
to his plan. He then told them that if they personally did
not feel committed tfcey should walk to the other side of the
flight deck and he would send them to another command. Seme
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took him up on this. They were off the ship within a week.
In addition to getting rid of those who said that they did
not want to be "on the team," this commanding officer got
rid of a lot of poor performers during the first week of his
command. The commanding officer said that he sent twenty
six personnel home during his first week command. Several
other captains related that they had separated a lot of poor
performers in the past year. The great majority of the
people we talked with supported their command's efforts to
get rid of poor performers. we freguently heard E3's and
E4's laud their command's efforts at getting rid of people
who did not want to perform or be on their ship. When we
asked what was done with personnel who did not fit into the
team, the answer was usually, "They are not around long."
Although malcontents and poor performers were not removed
just because they were not team players, they were removed
(if they did not change their ways) , and this had a positive
impact on the level of cooperation and teamwork on these
ships. Enhanced teamwork was viewed as a side benefit of a
policy to get rid of dead wood, but its benefits to the ship
were considered significant. We did not hear the old saw
that ninety percent of the time was being spent with ten
percent of the problem personnel. The bottom ten percent
appeared to be constartly under the gun, and if they did not
modify their behavior relatively quickly, they were gone.
Each of the ships differed on how hard and how long they
would work to get an individual to modify his ways, but all
of them had a breaking point which, when reached, resulted
in the departure of the poor performer, and it appeared that
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the breaking point was not that high. On one ship this was
summarized as follows: "You get one strike, but on strike
two vcu are out. HS
5 For an in depth discussion of the causes and values of
teamwork in organizations, the reader is referred tc Chester
I. Barnard* s The Functions of the Executive. [Ref. 4]
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X- 2HE SHIP IN A0T0M1IC
Although one could sense a high energy level on these
ships at all levels, there did not appear to be a let of
wasted effort. There was little work for work's sake. The
ships were in an efficient routine that everyone understood
and supported. Crisis management was the exception rather
than the norm, especially internally generated crisis
management. These ships had their fair share of short fused
problems to deal with, but usually these were considered the
result cf someone off the ship putting a short leadtime
demand upon the ship. Although the Ship's Organization and
Regulation Manual (SCEM) was not a vital document used in
the day-to-day management of all of the ships (only one of
these ships used the SORM on an almost daily basis) , the
concept of having "a way to do" various evolutions did
exist. With only a few exceptions, the officers and
enlisted personnel en these ships did not feel that they
were working harder cr longer hours than their counterparts
across the pier, and they did not feel that their shipmates
were abeve average in intellect or technical ability.
Rather, they felt that they were operating more efficiently
and getting more out cf their men and themselves than ether
ships.
The wheel was not being reinvented with great regularity
on these ships. There seemed to be time for everything,
including personal matters and crew recreation. Time
management was not stressed, but it appeared that there was
a good balance between undertaking short range, not so
important, urgent items and the not so urgent, longer range,
very important items. The important did not habitually lose
to the urgent.
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A. TBE SHIP DRIVING PROGRAMS, AND NOT PROGRAMS DRIVING THE
SHIP
It seemed that all of the various programs that the
shore establishment levied on these ships were being
complied with and given more or less the attention that the
"powers that be" thought each of these programs should get.
This is not to say that all programs were, in fact, given
equal emphasis, but the officers and enlisted personnel felt
that ncne of the programs was being given just lip service.
We heard very few complaints about "such and such a program"
not being alive and well. We asked all of these captains
which programs they gave the least attention to, and the
answer was usually that all programs were given attention.
We thought we might find that some of the commanding offi-
cers made a conscious decision to downplay certain programs,
but this was not the case. One captain's comment, "I cannot
think of any programs that we are supposed to be doing that
we are not," was typical of what we heard. Furthermore, the
programs on these ships were not seen as empires unto them-
selves. Instead, they were seen as parts that fit into an
integrated whole. Ihe purposes behind the programs were
known, and they fit into the ships* purposes, as the ships
had identified them for themselves. How they fit into the
big picture is discussed in the following chapter. Here we
will discuss the picgrams that were emphasized on these
excellent ships.
E. THROUGH KNOWLEDGE, BATTLE READINESS
All cf these ships had time for training and they did a
lot of it. On the average, these ships devoted three hours
each week tc on ship training for both the officers and the
enlisted personnel. Frequently we heard enlisted personnel
praising the training they were receiving. Chiefs would
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say, "This is the first ship that I have ever been on that
actually conducted training as it should be." There was a
lot cf concern with broadening individuals' knowledge cf not
only their rating but also their ship and the contributions
of their shipmates. In general, the Enlisted Surface
Warfare Specialist (ESWS) program received a lot of atten-
tion. (It was interesting to note that although all of the
ships had active ESWS programs, the vast majority of the
personnel we talked with felt that more could be done in
this area. They saw the benefits of the program and they
wanted to get as much from the program as possible.) Off
ship training was also stressed on these ships. The general
feeling expressed by supervisors was that people had to
learn their jobs to be effective, and if this reguired
others to work a little harder and longer to compensate for
the absence of a shipmate off at school, so be it. The ship
and the individual would benefit in the long run. Once
again, there was a lot of attention on long run benefits,
even at the expense of short run hardships. The captains
were the ones reguiring that training and professional
growth be kept high en their ships' priority lists, but they
appeared to have the total support of their subordinates.
Apparently, the benefits of training had made themselves
apparent to these crews.
We came across numerous examples of these ships empha-
sizing enhanced battle readiness through individual growth,
but none more telling than on the ship that conducted its
annual naval gunfire support gualification using members of
the "second team" on the computer consoles. As all cruiser-
destroyermen know, this is an important gualif ication and
the scores on this exercise receive a lot of scrutiny from
superiors, but to the captain of this ship and to his crew,
the scores were secondary to training the personnel who
needed the training the most. As one department head put
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it, "When we are off of Lebancn and standing condition III
watches, it very likely will be one of the junior men
sitting en the gunfire console who will have to perform. We
knew our first team could do their jobs well, and we knew
that the second and third teams needed the practice the
most. Therefore, the second and third teams were the ones
who get the training when we fired for qualification. For
sure the first team was standing over the shoulders of the
less experienced personnel, but when it was over, the
younger men knew that they had the ability to do their job."
This ship was driven not only by a desire to excel but also
by a vision of battle readiness being the standard ty which
excelling ultimately would be judged. Therefore, lower
scores on an exercise could and had to be tolerated in crder
to enhance the ship's battle readiness. This example is
given net because it is representative of how the ether
excellent ships approached exercises, but because it is
typical of the importance they attached to training the
entire ship and not just a chosen few and the demonstrated
devoticn to training and its long term benefits towards
personal growth. All of these ships targeted their training
programs at battle readiness. Only the direction frcm which
they fired differed.
Cne captain who put a very high priority on training
recounted that when he took command, the ship did not have
an effective training program. He realized the inadequacy
of the training program during the first week he was on
board. He immediately made one of only two edicts he remem-
bered makirg in his entire command tour. He mandated that
training be conducted for the first hour of every Tuesday
and Thursday. He said that if he heard a chipping hammer
during either of these training periods, he would go
berserk. As he was walking around the ship daily, he would
ask crew members about their training. Originally he got
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feedback frcm the crew that the training was not good. The
captain then went to the executive officer and told him that
his training program wasn't hacking it. The executive
officer squared away the program and it was very good from
then on. This commanding officer also pushed off-ship
training. He said that the off-ship training schedule was
one of the few pieces of paper that he paid attention to.
Again, when he walked around the ship, he would ask the
sailors what training they had scheduled in the future. He
was looking to see that there was some direction and
perceived personal gicwth. It was the department heads' and
division officers' responsibility to insure that such direc-
tion existed.
Training was one of another captain's top priorities,
and he was very proud of his existing training program. He
claimed it was second to none. Officers trained daily. The
ship used an available classroom at the head of the pier to
do a lot cf training. The captain was surprised how few
ether ships availed themselves of this valuable training
location. Several times during our interview he asserted,
"We really push training." He noted that meaningful
training was hard tc do, but that it must be strived for
continuously. He had a lot of interest in ESWS, and he was
proud of the ship's program. He added, however, that the
number cf qualified personnel was not that high. His
sailers also shared his interest and liking for the ESWS
program, as well as the captain's belief that more could be
done with the ship's program than was being done currently.
However, both the captain and the crew felt that the program
was heading in the right direction and that it would
continue to improve. This was just one of several examples
of less than excellent programs being viewed positively by
the crews of these ships because they were pleased with the
direction the programs were heading. There was an optimism
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and a confidence in the system; once identified, problems
would te solved.
C. IT NCT ONLY WORKS, IT LOOKS GOOD
These excellent ships were very clean and well preserved
and the crews took pride in this. However, they did not
feel that they were having to go to superhuman efforts or
spend an inordinate amount of time to achieve the sharp
internal and external appearance of their ships. In
general, everyone knew his jot, and everyone was doing his
job (or being taken tc task when he was not doing his jot)
,
and that was about all the people we met felt it tock tc get
the jot done in a professional, non-crisis manner.
Zone inspections were a vital and effective program on
all of these ships. Several captains and members of their
crews attributed much of the overall improvements in the
effectiveness of their ship to the captain initiating an
effective zone inspection program. Every captain actively
participated in his zcne inspection program. On some of the
ships the captain would be the only one who conducted zcne
inspections. On others, the executive officer and depart-
ment heads might also participate, but on none of the ships
did the captain delegate his responsibility for personally
inspecting.
Many of the crew thought of and talked of the zcne
inspection program as not just another ship's program, but
as their captain's zone inspection program. It was one of
the more effective ways these captains communicated their
standards and expectations to their crews, and the crews
appreciated their captain personally passing on this infor-
mation to them. One captain related that he started
stressing his zone inspection program the week he took
command. He used the zone inspection as a means of setting
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and raising standards of cleanliness, material readiness,
and management. He noted that it took a lot of his time
(two zone inspections per week for the first six months of
this captain's command tour) and energy to implement the
zone inspection program as he felt was required ("I had to
work like a dog"), but he was convinced that his efforts had
teen well rewarded in terms of enhanced material readiness
and cleanliness. Accountability was stressed during zone
inspections. This was felt to be the key to making the
program successful. The personnel presenting the spaces to
the inspecting officers were required to know the status of
discrepancies and to brief on what was being done to correct
any discrepancies, and woe betide an individual and his
supervisors if they were not up to this tasking.
The preventive iraintenance programs on these ships
received a lot of attention from all levels of the chain of
command. The captains went out of their way to demonstrate
their interest in this program. Some would include the
checking of the PMS program as part of their zone inspec-
tions, ethers would conduct spot checks of preventive main-
tenance checks. All insisted that their officers
demonstrate a keen interest in the program. One captain
noted that when he took command he would have his department
heads personally brief him on all preventive maintenance
checks that had not been completed during the previous week.
He was surprised to find that the department heads did not
have sound reasons as to why deferred checks had not been
completed. Immediately he made it clear to his department
heads that he expected one hundred percent PMS accomplish-
ment, and, in the event this was not possible, the depart-
ment head would be thoroughly familiar with the reason why a
check had not been completed and what was being done to get
it completed. This captain concluded by noting that after a
couple of weeks the department heads and their personnel saw
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the iaportance of giving PMS a great deal of attention and
from then on PMS was more or less put in automatic. On
several ships we heard people proudly state that one hundred
percent PMS accomplishment was expected of them and their
work centers. Working weekends to get caught up on PMS was
a norm on many of these ships, a norm that was accepted by
the crew as being part of what it took to be the best.
E. BEINGING THEM INTC THE FOLD
Although these ships were in many ways in automatic,
they did net rely sclely upon the ship's positive momentum
rubbing off on new personnel to inculcate in the new men the
ship's eiphasis on achieving excellence. They gave a lot of
attention to indoctrinating new personnel and to telling
them that "this is the way things are done on this ship."
Ihe captains of all of these ships personally met with every
man who joined. During these meetings the captains stressed
a few important points that they wanted each man to under-
stand. What was stressed differed from captain to captain,
but all of them stressed the command's desire to be the best
and seme basic values associated with the process that would
be followed in the quest for excellence. For example, one
of the captains placed special emphasis on indoctrinating
young sailors who were just out of the training command and
joining their first ship. After shaking hands and giving a
new man a ship's ball cap as he welcomed him to the team,
the captain would tell him something like this: "You know
right from wrong, never do anything that is ethically wrong.
No one owes you anything, take care of yourself first,
looking in the mirror in the morning, the only guy that
counts is looking back at you." Then he would ask, "When is
the last time you wrote home?" adding that if he did not
write to his parents, he would be doing so in the captain's
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presence. He concluded by telling the new sailor to give
his folks good news, as they deserved this for what they had
done for the man. The new sailor was learning from the
captain personally that each person on the ship was impor-
tant and that his new command was concerned about his
welfare. A positive first impression was being made, and
the man was being brought into the family by the head of the
family, the captain.
Another captain said that he always pointed out to the
new men joining the ship that the ship had a good reputa-
tion. He would mention all of the ship's departmental
excellence awards. In this way, the new people realized
that "they (their leaders) are serious about the ship doing
well." At the indoctrination training for new personnel,
the commanding officer would always tell them that "the Navy
is a way of life" and that pride and responsibility were key
elements of this life. Again, the focus was on a few key
thoughts (we are after excellence and each individual is key
to achieving excellence) that the captain wanted the new man
to understand and begin to internalize.
When asked about the discipline on these ships, the
answer was invariably "The captain is fair but firm, and he
is consistent." In addition to being consistent from mast
case to mast case, the captain's discipline philosophy
appeared to be consistent with his broader leadership
philosophy. People did not attend a mast and leave
wondering why the captain did what he did. There were very
few surprises at mast. Mast cases got what they expected
the captain would give them, and, in general, the mast cases
got what the crew felt they should get. The captain and
discipline seemed synonymous. People were given a chance if
they nade a mistake, but they did not get many second
chances and they were usually gone by the third chance. On
all of these ships the captain tended to "give the max" for
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the first drug offense and to get rid of anyone who was
involved for drugs for a second time. The officers and men
on these ships felt that drug use on their ship was low. On
several, this was a big change from a year or so ago when
drugs were a big problem.
In general, discipline was in automatic on these ships.
Mast happened on the same day every week, only people who
deserved tc go to mast went, and those that did go got what
they deserved. Discipline was no big deal. It was handled
as it should be in the eyes of officers, chiefs, senior
petty officers, jurior petty officers, and non-rated
personnel. Although each of these ships stuck to the tradi-
tional fair, firm and consistent philosophy regarding disci-
pline, they varied a lot in the mechanics they used to carry
out the discipline process. On one ship, the chiefs served
as a discipline review body charged with investigating all
report chits and fcrwarding their recommendations for
processing to the commanding officer via the executive
officer. On another ship, every mast was televised and
shown on SHE TV during the noon hour. Watching the mast
cases on TV was voluntary, but as it turned out, almost
every member of the crew turned out to view the proceedings.
The captain of the ship that showed the masts on TV stated
that his ship had the lowest mast rate in the fleet and that
televising masts had a lot to do with the ship's high state
of discipline. On cne other ship, the captain made masts a
mandatory all hands evolution. Masts were conducted on the
foc's'le in full view of the entire crew. This was the one
ship's captain that we were not able to interview, but
everyone else we talked with on this ship, from the execu-
tive officer to seamen, felt that the high visibility given
mast cases had had a very positive impact on the ship.
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E. THE MANAGEMEHT PBCCESS, SIMPLE AND CONSISTENT
In general, on these ships, the management process
tended to be as follows: The captain decided what was most
important and what the key priorities were; middle manage-
ment took care cf most of the day-to-day "whats," and when
need re, they provided the "why" something was important;
and how things were done was delegated to as low a level as
possible, frequently to the junior petty officer or non-
rated man level. Although the captains of these ships left
much of the determining of what would be done on their ships
to their subordinates (provided their priorities were being
complied with), they went out of their way to know what was
being dene on their ships; however, they consciously avoided
involving themselves directly in the determination cf how
things wculd be done. They functioned as monitors and not
doers. The captains were conspicuous by their absence in
the running of the ship's routine. This was left to the
executive officer and the officers and senior enlisted
personnel. Several captains commented that freguently they
felt the urge to intervene and show the cognizant person a
better way (their way) of approaching problems, but they
fought this temptation and forced their juniors to come up
with suitable solutions on their own.
Planning received a lot of attention on these ships.
The captains tended to do much of the long range planning
(six months or more into the future) . As one captain put
it, "I'm the only cne who has the time to look six months
down the road." The rest of the intra-ship planning was
done by the executive officer and the department heads, and
monitored to varying degrees by the captain. Some ships
used formal documents, such as plans of actions and mile-
stones, and others did not. But all of the ships felt that
they spent a lot of time planning and that this investment
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in tine payed off in the long run in increased efficiency
and enhanced performance. The old maxim, "There is never
enough time to plan but there is always enough time to do it
over," was not the way these ships operated. On one ship
the planning function was augmented by rehearsal as a means
of achieving excellence. Whenever this ship had a major
evolution to complete, such as an OPPE, the ship would add
to its planning for the ma jor event a full dress rehearsal
several weeks in advance. The executive officer of this
ship was convinced that this act alone had much to do with
the top results the ship was able to achieve for all its
tasking.
Meetings were not a problem on these ships. Meetings were
held, but the ships were not "meeting crazy." The meetings
that they did have had a purpose and were considered useful
by these who attended. They also occurred on time and they
did net drag on. One executive officer stated that he had
inherited a ship that was in automatic when it came to meet-
ings and daily routine. A lot of time was not spent finding
people fcr evolutions and meetings. Everyone showed up when
and where he was supposed to. We never did uncover why this
happened on this ship, but, like the executive officer, we
were impressed and of the opinion that this efficient
routine contributed to the ship's excellence.
F. THE IMPORTANCE OF STANDARDS (NO STANDARDS, NO
EXCELLENCE)
Cn all of these ships, the officers and the crew felt
that their ships had very high standards across the beard.
High standards of cleanliness, appearance, conduct, and
interpersonal behavior were, in general (there were seme
exceptions) , a source of pride for the crews of these ships.
It was freguently stated that when the incumbent commanding
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officer took command, one of the first things he did was
raise the standards cf cleanliness expected of the ship.
The junior enlisted frequently commented that they initially
did not like the idea of having to work harder to achieve
higher standards, but they were now of the opinion that
whatever extra work it took was worthwhile. In general,
they liked the fact that when one of the men from their ship
walked down the pier he looked sharper than a man from
another ship on the pier. They were extremely proud of the
fact that their ship "was the cleanest in the fleet." (Just
as many people we talked with thought that their ship was
the steaningest in the fleet.)
Asked why they were proud that their ship was able to
maintain higher standards than their sister ships, sailors
would mention how they were proud to bring their family and
friends on the ship and to hear them praise the ship's
appearance and clearliness. They also liked hearing such
comments from people touring the ship when the ship was
deployed. They also would comment frequently that it did
not take all that much more effort to keep the ship locking
as good as it did.
Another theme that ran through several of the ships
regarding cleanliness and appearance had to do with the crew
viewing their ship as their home. For those who truly
internalized this view, it made complete sense to them to
keep their ship looking good. Many of the sailors we talked
to on these ships subscribed to what we read on the guarter-
deck cf one of the ships that we visited, "This is not just
a ship, it is your home." This analogy of the ship being
the crew's home fit very well with the analogy that the crew
was not just a group cf officers and sailors, but rather a
family. The power of the "family" spirit on these ships was
in several incidences incredible to observe. On these
ships, the vast majority of the crew had internalized the
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vision and the values of the ship as espoused by the
captain. There was a powerful sense of ownership that made
people think of the ship as "their ship" and not "the ship."
High standards played an important part in the developing of
such a positive attitude. They were a source of pride.
Asked about how standards fit into his command philos-
ophy, ore commanding officer said that cleanliness was the
key. "All else revclves around this." He noted that when
he took ever the ship it was not clean, and, to get his
views across to the crew, he told them that they might think
that they were good but that it was impossible, in his mind,
to be good even if you were dressed in a tuxedo when you
were standing in a pig sty with muck up to your ankles, and
this is the way he saw the ship. To get the ship clean to
the commanding officer's standards, he divided the ship into
eighty zenes and personally inspected two zones twice a week
every week come hell or high water. This was how he got his
standards across to the crew. He personally showed them
where they did not neasure up. He also noted that the
fanrocms on the ship were in a poor state of repair when he
assumed command. To get them up, he personally involved
himself with one of the poorer fanrooms. Working with a
small group of sailors, he had the fanroom completely refur-
bished in strict accordance with the technical guidance on
how a fanroom should be. Once this was done and the
fanrocm locked great, the commanding officer sent a memo
(one of his few pieces of written correspondence) to each of
the officers and chiefs. It went something like this.
There was a major reclamation project taking place in the
county of (name of the ship) and the model property (the
fanrocm) had just been completed and was now open for
inspection by everyone. It was anticipated that within the
next couple of months all of the units in the county would
re of the same high calibre as the model. With this model,
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the captain felt his khaki could see what was expected of
them and guestions did not have to be asked and answered.
The ship's fanrooms made a remarkable improvement within six
months. The commanding officer felt that they were now the
test faniooms in the fleet. They were not only a source of
pride to him, they were a source of pride to the crew.
Ihis captain's method of communicating his standards to
his crew was one of the more innovative methods we came
across, but all of the captains we met on these ships went
to great lengths to ccmmunicate their standards. The chain
of corcmand was used and so were written policy statements to
get across the captain's standards, but much much more was
done alsc. In fact, these captains prided themselves on
never missing an opportunity to get across their standards
to the crew. In addition to involving themselves totally in
the zone inspection program, they pointed out over and over
again to their officers and enlisted personnel what they
expected, hardly ever missing an opportunity to talk stan-
dards. They talked standards to the wardroom, the chiefs
mess, the first class mess, various divisions at captain's
calls, and to new people joining. Stressing standards was
an everyday job, one that these captains took to with all of
their energy.
G. IN TEE KNOW
Cn these ships, people were kept very well informed.
Great emphasis was made to inform individuals from the day
they joined what was expected of them, where they fit into
the shiproard organization, and where the ship fit into the
"big picture." When we talked with the chiefs, they felt
strongly that they were "in the know" and that they had the
information they needed to keep their personnel informed.
Furthermore, the jucicr sailors also felt that they had a
tig picture perspective of what the ship was doing.
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These captains went to great lengths to keep their crews
informed of how the ship fit into the big picture, why it
was gcing from point alpha to point bravo, the impact the
ship's actions would have on the fleet, the Navy, and the
nation. Even the nest mundane tasks were explained as to
the importance they had with regard to the ship being battle
ready and able tc carry out its mission. The crews appreci-
ated the explanations of how what they were doing contrib-
uted to the whole of what the ship was doing.
The captains were key players in the communications
process. They held a lot of captain's calls. Two captains
held captain's call ence a week. Underway, almost all the
captains talked to the crew on the 1 MC several times a day.
when a new man joined, each of the captains met with him and
communicated a short message of what was expected of him.
They felt that personal communications were the key to
getting their message to the sailors. Memos would net do,
nor would SITE TV. The chain of command was important and
used, but it had to be augmented by one-on-one communica-
tions. We were told that you probably could not communicate
too much, tut it was easy to communicate too little, and the
results would be bad if you did not communicate enough. All
of the captains felt that it was their responsibility to
spend a lot of their time walking around the ship, not for
the exercise, but because this was how they showed that they
were truly concerned with their personnel and because this
was the best way to communicate up and down the chain of
command. Several of the captains said that they spent fifty
percent of their time in port walking around the ship,
asking people what they were doing, noting what wasn't going
well (e.g., people working without a sense of direction),
and just showing that they were concerned and involved with
the ship.
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XI. HIGH ENEEGY LEfEL^BIAS TOWARDS ACTION
The people we met on these ships were keen. There was a
lot of energy about them. Yet these ships also seemed very
relaxed. The officers and crew liked to talk about their
ship and to discuss what was being done right. They were
not hesitant to mention areas where their ship cculd and
should improve. However, we were impressed with how few
"gripes" the people w€ talked with on these ships had. He
heard an occasional complaint about the SWO program not
being as active as seme of the junior officers would like; a
couple of junior enlisted personnel took exception with seme
of the particulars of the command's dress standards; or one
cf the groups on the ship, e.g., the first class petty offi-
cers, might not be performing to as high a level as seme of
the other groups thought they should be. However, very
little energy surrounded these negatives. The people got
excited when they discussed what the ship was doing right,
not what it was doing wrong.
A. fIX IT NOB
There was also a strong feeling of independence about
these ships, especially among the junior officers and the
enlisted personnel. They saw their ship standing out from
all other ships, and they looked upon the people who wrote
the ship's schedule and inspected the ship as the opposi-
tion. They saw themselves doing great in spite of these
outside influences. It was amusing to hear group after
group on ship after ship describe itself as the steamingest
ship in the fleet. They did not particularly like that fact
that they had to do so much steaming, but they sure were
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proud of the fact that they were steamers and not "pier
queens." We heard ycung sailors just as frequently as we
heard captains and department heads say that the ship
performed test when it was underway a lot. In keeping with
their pride in being independent and controllers of their
own fate, at least within the bulkheads of their ship, we
frequently heard the personnel on these ships speak highly
of their ability to fix themselves, and not having to rely
on the shore establishment. The general attitude was that
their ship had the ability to fix itself ninety five percent
of the time. If a problem did occur that was beyond the
ability of the ship tc handle, the ship would still have a
go at it, and only after every effort had been exhausted to
make the fix using in house talent would the ship go to
outside activities for help. When outside help was
requested, these shits would do everything in their power to
learn frcm the outside help and to get the outside help off
the ship as soon as possible after the solution to the
problem had been found.
Another aspect of the importance attached to self-
sufficiency was the fact t tat it was a norm on these ships
that personnel would work as long as required to fix any of
their equipment that went down. If that meant working the
weekend day and night, so be it. This was one of the shared
values of the command that seemed to fit into the quest for
the shared vision of the ship as being battle ready. This
attitude did not exist solely because the captain or the
other officers said that it would; it existed because the
crew had internalized this attitude of "my ship." Cne
department head related how the attitude towards self-
sufficiency changed when the present commanding officer took
command. Prior to his arrival, the ship had a high opinion
of itself (higher than that of the ship's superiors). When
gear went down, a decision would be made as to how important
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the gear was, and if it was very important people would
remain onboard until it was fixed; if not so important, they
would leave at the end of the day and work on it tomorrow.
With the new CO, all equipment would be repaired before
people hit the beach. If gear went down at night, people
would be brought in tc repair it. This policy was not well
received by the technicians initially. There were a let of
complaints about working nights. But now, somehow, people
had changed their views and no longer complained. They saw
it as part cf their job to work on their gear until it was
up. On all the ships we visited we heard stories from the
officers, tut also the sailors, that their command's atti-
tude to dewn equipment was "fix it now." In addition to
agreeing on this as the attitude, these people, including
those who had to work nights to make the policy a reality,
acted as if this were the only way to run a ship, at least
as if it were the only way to run an excellent ship. To
them, it was a small price to pay to be number one.
B. INVOLVEMENT YES, MICRO- MANAGEMENT NO
The word "involvement" was heard over and over again on
these ships when discussing the causes of excellence. The
captain felt that it was important that he be very involved
in the ship, the crew saw the chiefs as being highly
involved in the running of their divisions, the chiefs were
impressed by the invclvement of the officers, the junior
officers saw their captain's high level of involvement as
proof that he meant what he said when he talked about the
importance of personal sacrifice and concern for the welfare
of subordinates. Ncne of these captains, none of these
wardrooms, and none of these chiefs messes was viewed by
subordinates as being uninvolved in the day-to-day opera-
tions of the ship. Just the opposite was true, and their
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involvement was perceived as a very positive force
contributing greatly to the ship's success. The involvement
was seen as a demonstration of interest and concern. It was
not perceived as and did not take the form of micro-
management. When dealing with specific problems, these
commanding officers were seen as being interested and
supportive of efforts by both the officer and enlisted
personnel to produce not just descriptions of the problem
but also solutions. These captains would ask questions and
make comments, but they rarely would dictate solutions or
courses cf action. Several captains commented that they had
to fight the urge to solve their subordinates' problems when
they were presented to the captain by the subordinate, but
they, on the whole, were successful in fighting this urge to
take action rather than require action of others. One
captain, perhaps the least process oriented commanding
officer cf the ones we interviewed, noted that the captain
must make subordinates develop their own solutions for their
cwn personal growth and, perhaps more importantly, to fester
a sense of ownership in each man of the ship's problems. He
concluded by saying he was continuously striving to get the
junior er.listed men to take ownership for their work and to
correct problems on their own, without having to be told to
do so. This was seen as a key to achieving excellence.
C. TEE COEST FOE EXCELLENCE STARTS ON DAY ONE
The commanding officers of these ships stepped on board
their new commands knowing what they wanted to do with their
ships. They did not take a lot of time to assess what they
had in the way of a crew before making it known that busi-
ness would not be conducted as it had been in the past
(before their arrival). One captain who was typical said he
took about a week to size up his ship. This was all the
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time he felt he needed to determine what he had in the way
of strengths and weaknesses. This assessment was done very
informally by just walking around the ship and watching what
people were doing and talking with officers and enlisted
personnel. The early stages of these commanding officers'
tours were not a time for participative management when it
came to deciding upcn the direction the ship would proceed
and hew business would be conducted. Sometimes this bias
towards action and bias towards doing business as the
captain said it would be done gave some members of the crew
problems. There were several stories of difficulties expe-
rienced getting used to the new captain's desires and
methods, but the transition period was short on all of these
ships. Within months the men got on their captain's team
(or left the ship), and there was no looking back, except to
smile when retelling the stcry of what it was like when the
new captain arrived. Most of the captains we talked with
felt that it took about six months to get their ships on
toard to their way of doing business.
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III. PRESENCE 01 A COM HON VISION AND SHARED VALUES
A. A FOCUS ON WHAT'S IMPORTANT
Cn mcst of these ships, a great deal of effort had not
been expended to develop a grand strategy for success;
however, such a strategy did exist on every ship. The
strategy existed because the captains of these ships brought
with them a vision cf what they wanted their ship to look
like and practical techniques in leadership and management
to take their ships in the direction of their vision of
excellence. In addition to knowing what they wanted their
ships to lock like, these captains realized the importance
of inculcating this vision in their officers and enlisted
personnel. Sometimes this would take the form of philosoph-
ical discussions between the captain and his senior offi-
cers, ether times it would only manifest itself in a
consistency of action and interaction between the captain
and various members and groups of the crew, but the presence
of a consistent "modus operandi" was discerned by the offi-
cers and enlisted personnel as both a tactical game plan for
governing day-to-day behavior and as a strategy for
achieving a futuristic vision of what the ship could become.
In other words, they knew what the captain wanted to do with
the ship, where they fit into a plan of action aimed at
turning the vision into reality, and how they were going to
go about accomplishing whatever it was they wanted.
Furthermore, by and large, many of the officers and enlisted
personnel, even the most junior (which was truly impres-
sive)
, had internalized the values associated with the
captain's vision, whether or not the strategy to achieve the
vision was explicit cr implicit. If the captain was pushing
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tattle readiness, the crew was doing likewise. If the
captain was hot on safety, so was the crew. When we asked a
groups of E4's and below what was their captain's priority,
invariably the answer would be identical to what the captain
had tcld us his primary goal was during our interview with
him earlier in the day.
B. FOE THE CAUSE, BATTLE READINESS
As it turned out, the captain's overriding emphasis on
all of these excellent ships, as pronounced by the captain
and perceived by the crew, was battle readiness. What
might be unique about the emphasis on battle readiness on
these ships was not that it was the espoused goal of the
command, but that the crew had bought into this strategy and
accepted it as their own. Most of these captains went out
of their way to relate whatever the ship was doing or what
an individual was doing to the ship's mission and to being
tattle ready. As one captain put it, "I stress to the offi-
cers and crew why we are here. The bottom line is our
mission." Another captain kept reminding his crew, "I want
the Russians to quake in their boots when this ship steams
over the horizon." He kept this image in front of the crew
continuously, and he converted them to his way of thinking.
They wanted the same thing their captain wanted, and they
internalized his desire to make whatever effort was required
to achieve the level of battle readiness needed. On these
ships, such things as OPPE's, assist visits, and all the
other requirements levied upon ships by outside sources were
not viewed as ends in themselves. They were only bridges to
cross on the road to tattle readiness. Rather than peaking
for inspections, these ships prided themselves as teing
always tattle ready and being able to see past the
inspections to the real world, the world in which battle
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readiness was the ultimate criterion by which a ship would
he judged. One captain said that he did nothing special to
prepare for inspections and tasking, adding, "Frankly, I
did not worry about much. I was just concerned that we
would do our best." However, the captain was very proud of
the ship's accomplishments.
C. VALUE DEIVEN INTIEPERSO NAL RELATIONSHIPS
In addition to being in sync with their captain
regarding the purpose, goals, and objectives to be empha-
sized on their ship, the officers and enlisted men en these
ships were, in general, in sync with their captain regarding
the means to be used to achieve these outcomes. Values
associated with and styles for dealing with subordinates,
superiors, and peers tended to be consistent among the
various levels of the chain of command on each of these
ships. That is not to say that all of these ships had
similar values or leadership styles, they did not: but on
any given ship in this group, values and leadership style
tended tc be consistent and similar. However, what seemed
important to these crews was not the attention given a
specific value or set of values, but the fact that the
leaders cf these ships were value driven when dealing with
feople and their actions tended to be consistent and in
harmony with their emphasized values. The captains were not
viewed as being capricious, and they did not allow their
officers and senior enlisted to be so. People knew where
the leaders were coming from and they appreciated the sense
of stability that resulted.
The people we met felt that they were trusted and
treated with respect. They felt that their efforts were
appreciated and that it was part of their responsibility to
demonstrate their appreciation of the efforts of their
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subordinates. The captain was credited on most of these
ships as being the man most responsible for enhancing inter-
personal interactions by insisting upon behavior consistent
with espoused values. He dealt with everyone he met in a
professional and gentlemanly manner. This did not mean that
he did net show his temper or censure poor performance, tut
it did mean that when this did occur it was always done in a
professional manner and personalities were not attacked;
only actions were criticized, not personalities. Also, in
addition to setting an example for his subordinates to
emulate, the captain either demanded that his subordinates
act in a similar manner or he established a climate where
such behavior became the norm through choice. We came
across very few examples of officers and senior enlisted
personnel teing seen by peers or subordinates as ill
mannered and unprofessional when dealing with shipmates.
The feeling was that such behavior was not acceptable. When
new people joined who started out on the wrong foot when
dealing with their subordinates, their peers would take them
aside and set them right. Several groups of junior officers
and chiefs related how they had had new members join their
groups and not hold up the norms of behavior for dealing
with subordinates and how these new men had been set right
and brought on board. The captain had set the tone, the
officers and senior enlisted had internalized it, and new
personnel were being indoctrinated without the captain
having tc dc a thing.
The fact that such a positive type of climate flourished
under these captains had very much to do with the high
regard in which the captain was held. The phrase we heard
over and over again when an officer or an enlisted man was
asked to describe his captain was, "He acts like a human
being and he treats ethers as human beings." One got the
feeling listening to these junior officers and enlisted men
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describe their captains as human beings, that this was cne
of the highest compliments that a junior could bestow on his
senior.
In dealing with bcth their officers and the crew, most
of the captains we net did so in such a way that a man's
dignity was enhanced rather than lessened. On most ships,
very rarely did leaders resort to emotional outbursts when
they detected poor performance. Rather, emotions usually
were kept in check. Efforts were made to find the cause of
a problem rather than just treat the symptom of a problem.
There were a couple cf captains in this group who did tend
to loose their temper, but somehow the officers and men
under these leaders were able to put aside the emotions of
their superiors and see them as professionals in search of
top performance. Jihy these captains were not perceived
negatively for their emotionalism probably has something to
do with their personalities and style, but we were not able
to put our finger on the answer to this intriguing question.
The emotionalism of these officers was consistent with the
high energy they had for excelling at everything they did,
and the crew and officers, by and large, saw these officers'
behavior directed to the same goal they identified with,
excellence. Another attribute that the more emotional
captains had that contributed to the crew's respect for
these officers was that these captains were viewed as having
short memories. In ether words, they might get mad, but
once the event or act causing their wrath was history, they
put it cut of their Hinds and the people involved felt that
the captain did not held it against them.
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XIII. AS 2HE CAPTAIN, SO IS THE SHIP
A. IHEOBTANCE OF THE CAPTAIN
Without a doubt, the most obvious attribute observed on
all of the excellent ships we studied was the importance of
the commanding officer to the success of the ship. Some of
the captains found this to be so obvious as to not bear
mentioning, while ethers were a little surprised when we
told them that they were seen by their subordinates as the
key reason behind the success of the ship.
First we will let you hear what the captains had tc say
about their importance to their ships and their successes,
and then we will hear from their crews. This will be
followed by a discussion of the similarities and differences
we observed in these commanding officers regarding the roles
they assumed, the focus of their efforts, and the beliefs
underlying their actions.
B. THEODGH THE CAPTAIN'S EYES
Asked why his ship performed so well, one captain said
that it primarily was due to "intense command interest" on
his behalf. He noted that he had served previously as a
chief staff officer en a tactical destroyer squadron in the
Atlantic Fleet, and during this tour he had become convinced
that "the captain makes the ship." During his destroyer
squadrcn tour, he attempted to discern and learn the keys to
success and top perfcrmance by closely observing the squad-
ron's eight commanding officers and their ships. He
concluded that there was a perfect positive correlation
between the performance of the ships and the involvement and
abilities of the captains he observed. The great ships had
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great captains, the fair ships had fair captains, and the
poor ships had poor captains. He went on to add that he had
never seen an exception to the great ship - great captain
rule. Ihis captain felt that his current command was a
great ship, and much of this was due to the fact that his
predecessor had been a great captain. This did not mean
that the ship was perfect (neither he nor we have come
across a perfect ship), but to him it was one of the best in
the fleet and there was no escaping the fact that the
previous captain had been the key to the success of the
ship. This captain was modest and did not mention his
importance to the current success of his ship, but everyone
else we talked to on this ship came to a similar conclusion
regarding why the ship was great: they had a super captain,
the best. They also mentioned that his predecessor had been
top notch. Among the more senior officers and enlisted
personnel, there was a feeling that they had been very lucky
to have had the opportunity to work for such great
commanding officers. The junior officers and junior
enlisted men also appreciated the ability and importance of
their captain to the success of the ship, but, as one might
expect, they did net focus on the uniqueness of their
captain's abilities to the extent the more senior personnel
did.
One cemmanding officer had very strong views on how one
achieved excellence in ships. He stated, however, that
before he would provide his views on what a cemmanding
officer, officers, and crew should do to achieve excellence,
he wanted to make perfectly clear his fundamental belief
that he considered it mandatory that one "decide to use a
positive approach" when taking command and not the very
common "you can't do" attitude that he saw many captains
using. By this he meant that there were reams of instruc-
tions and guidance en what a commanding officer could not
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do. He felt that these were net worth the paper they were
printed on. Instead of paying attention to what "the
system" said a commanding officer could not do, he felt that
it was critical that a commanding officer concentrate on
what he could do to get the job done. He felt that it was
his superiors* job to tell him what they wanted him and his
ship tc do, and then it was his job to determine how he
would achieve that which they had told him to do. He added
that if a commanding officer played it safe and worried a
lot about what he could and could not do, he would, at best,
have an average, safe, uneventful and uninspired cemmand
tour. "You can't worry about your career. You must be
comfortable with yourself. You can't have both the security
of doing it by the beck and the energy that comes from doing
it the way you feel it should be done. Command of a ship
must b€ seen as an end in itself, and the ship as the
captain's own little world."
The commanding officer felt that it was important that
he instill in his subordinates a "can do" philosophy in sync
with his own and that he give his subordinates the latitude
to determine for themselves the "how" for the "what" that
the commanding officer specified he wanted. In general,
this cemmanding officer thought that he was successful in
getting his officers to think positively and to think in
terms of how they could accomplish a given task rather than
why they could not. However, he was not confident that
these officers would he able to retain such a positive frame
of mind if they went to their next command and had to work
for "can't doers." In general the captain felt that most
(ninety five percent) men wanted to do well at what they and
their organization were doing. However, the system sometimes
limited individuals. As the captain, he felt that it was
his jcb to remove the limitations on individuals and to
instill in them the desire to be the best at everything they
undertook.
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A second captain gave his views on command. Asked to
what he attributed the success of his ship, this commanding
officer laughed and said that he did not have a one shot
answer to this question. After some thought, he said that
he stressed uniformity in the way business was conducted on
the ship and in the standards used on the ship. He said
that there was a sense of fairness and concern for the crew,
and that "management knows their people." Regarding shewing
concern for people, the captain said that he would not
settle fcr anything less than a high level of concern for
subordinates. He said that everyone in the chain was
responsible for insuring that this requirement was enforced.
He added that he insists that division officers be close to
their people, and that they strive to make their presence
felt. When the captain discussed "concern" for subordi-
nates, he mainly meant such things as insuring that their
work and living spaces were up to high standards, that they
were given help when they needed it in dealing with personal
problems, and that ether factors relating to their physical
needs were receiving proper attention; however, he alsc saw
the importance of juniors feeling that their superiors truly
cared about their welfare, and, in this light, such care was
aimed at some cf the psychological needs of the crew.
Several times the captain came back to the idea of stressing
the importance of improving the quality of life of the crew.
He noted that the ship was twenty years old and not as habi-
table as seme of the newer ships, and that it took extra
effort to enhance the crew's quality of life, but, even so,
this could and should be done by all personnel in positions
of responsibility. The commanding officer later added that
the ship's success was not due to the fact that personnel
worked harder than on ether ships. He implied that his crew
was more committed and more efficient and this led to their
being more effective than most ships.
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Another captain keyed on the importance of his teing
involved with his crew and his ship. He stressed that it
was important that he display a high personal interest in
what the crew was doing on a day-to-day basis. He spent a
lot of his time walking around the ship, visiting most
spaces daily. He would ask crew members what their problems
are and what were their plans for correcting them. He would
also point out those things that he thought needed correc-
tion. He might also go to the division officer and say "I
did not see a sense cf direction in the work your men are
doing." The captain added that he took the time to get
around the ship because he felt that if you take an interest
in people they will respond.
As has been mentioned previously, all of the captains of
these excellent ships were very oriented to doing well on
the tasks confronting their ships and to being battle ready.
Some, however, were more inclined to want to do well at
everything, while others considered it important to concen-
trate only on what they thought was important. Whereas one
commanding officer might see the Combined Federal Campaign
fund raising drive as inconseguential and not contributing
to enhancing the ship*s battle readiness, another might see
it as yet another way for the ship to distinguish itself.
The latter group seemed to want to do well in even the inci-
dental matters because they placed a very high importance on
the ship and her crew gaining an image of themselves as
doers and winners in everything they undertook. The former
group seemed to feel that if the crew did well at its
mission and those inspections and requirements directly
related to its mission, pride would follow.
Whereas all of the captains were very oriented towards
accomplishing the tasks assigned to their ships, there was a
wide spectrum of beliefs and philosophies regarding hew to
deal with officers and enlisted personnel and how to
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motivate them and gain their commitment for accomplishing
the tasks that the captain considered important. All agreed
that their personnel were the key to the success of their
ships, tut they differed on how to get the most out of this
most important ingredient. At one end of the spectrum was
the captain who described himself as a strict disciplina-
rian. He telieved that it was his job to set standards high
and demand that these standards be met. On the opposite end
of the spectrum was the captain who had similar views
regarding the importance of high standards and excelling at
individual tasks, but who was of the opinion that it was his
job as commanding officer to develop an environment in the
ship that made personnel want to perform well. In the
middle of this group was the captain who saw his role as
that of a monitor of performance and setter of the proper
example for professional behavior. Leadership, not a given
leadership style, was one of the keys to excellence.
On these ships, however, it was striking to note the
similarity in leadership philosophies found among the offi-
cers and senior enlisted personnel. The similarity existed
not among the total group of ships but rather on each indi-
vidual ship. That is, on one ship the captain put a very
high emphasis on task accomplishment and a much lower
emphasis on getting subordinates to internalize his desire
that the ship do well. He felt what was needed primarily to
get the results he wanted was to demand that his people put
forward the requisite effort. If he had the energy to make
these demands and to follow up on them, the ship would do
well. Talking to others on this ship, we heard very similar
comments from the more senior officers and enlisted
personnel. "We tell them what to do and we make sure they
do it and as a result we are top notch." On other ships in
the group (the majority) , the captain would stress the task
and also stress the importance of developing a positive
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climate throughout the chain of command for undertaking the
task. He avoided edicts. On these ships, the more senior
officers and chiefs appeared to follow the lead of their
captain. They tended to cultivate rather than demand the
commitnent of their juniors as they went about undertaking
tasks. This is not to say that they were "touchy feely" or
that they gave priority to the concerns for individuals over
concern for the task. The task always dominated on the
ships we visited, but on many of the ships a lot of emphasis
was given to motivating the crew and gaining their commit-
ment to accomplishing the tasks confronting the ship.
C. THROUGH THE CREW'S EYES
The officers and enlisted personnel working for these
captains were quite convinced that their captain was the
driving force behind their ship's success. In many cases
the cajtain was held in extremely high esteem, in others he
was revered, in none was he considered anything less than a
total professional. On some of the ships, the admiration
for the captain was amazing to observe. We frequently heard
statements at all levels within the ship, such as, "This
captain is the finest commanding officer I have ever worked
for" and "If I ever have to go to war, this is the guy I
want to go with.
"
When we heard officers and crew members state that their
ship was great due mainly to the fact it had a great
commanding officer, we would ask, "What makes him a great
commanding officer?" The answers covered a wide range.
Here is a sampling of what we heard. From a group of
chiefs, "He is honest. He will chew you out when necessary
but he gives recognition when it is due." From the first
class on this ship, "He insures that all programs on the
ship are emphasized. He is laid back and not afraid to
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mingle with the crew. He talks to you and he is not afraid
to listen to ideas. He helps good people when they want to
re-enlist, and he is not afraid to get rid of bad people."
The junior enlisted shared their seniors* admiration and
respect for their commanding officer. They noted that "He
knows what is going en in the ship, he gets around a lot,
and he will help people when they have problems." They added
that he was the driving force behind the high state of
cleanliness on the ship. His zone inspections were
demanding tut highly regarded. One E3 noted that his
captain expects outstanding results during zone inspections.
He said that when the captain came upon a space that he did
not think was up to his standards he would say, "If this is
your preparation for a zone inspection, how will you handle
everyday work?" This usually got through to the individual
the captain was addressing, and as a result the ship was
kept very clean.
D. WHAT TBEY DID AND WHAT THEY STRESSED
In addition to the roles levied upon all commanding
officers by Navy Regulations, numerous directives, and
tradition, the commanding officers of these excellent ships
assumed the following not so traditional roles which they
and/or their subordinates considered important to their
ships* achievement of excellence: senser and molder of
command climate, champion of excellence, long range planner,
instiller of values, and integrator of action and thought.
Some of these roles have been addressed in earlier chapters.
Those that have not will be discussed here.
There was a uniformity about each of these ships, and it
was not just in the results they achieved. On some ships
their henogeneity may have evolved without tampering from
above, but on others, it was a result of the commanding
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officer's concerted efforts to achieve a oneness, to take
the numerous parts of his command and transform them into a
cohesive whole. None of these captains was prepared to sit
hack and deal with the organizational climate that they had
been dealt. They set out to mold it to their liking, and
they succeeded. For example, one commanding officer saw his
key role as that of orchestrator of the command climate. To
him, this meant putting flare into the ship, and instilling
in the crew a sense cf uniqueness. He saw himself as the
"father figure" for the ship, the one person most respon-
sible for setting the ship's tone. He did this in a number
of ways, a key one being, as he put it, "by planning victo-
ries for the ship." Ey this he meant that he constantly was
on his guard locking for competition that the ship could
enter into reasonably sure that it would emerge victorious.
This could be something as trivial as challenging ether
ships in the task group to a sailing competition, knowing
full well that their ship was the only one that had any sail
boats, to seeking recognition as the top ship to complete
refresher training in a given year. In either case, the
crew's image of itself was enhanced by such actions, whether
it was by getting a laugh listening to the captain describe
how their ship had offered the other ships in the task force
to rent their sailboats for the competition, or by enhancing
their sense of pride while listening to the Fleet Training
Group cccmodore describe the superlative performance of the
ship while undergoing refresher training. This same captain
stressed that in searching cut victories for his ship it was
imperative that his actions be guided by the criteria that
whatever he did he did for the crew. If this was not the
case, the crew quickly would sense his lack of integrity,
and his efforts would be doomed to failure.
These ships had extremely high expectations of them-
selves. On one ship, they prided themselves as only being
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satisfied when they achieved 4.0 results. If they partici-
pated in a graded exercise and scored ninety five percent,
everyone knew that the captain's first comment would he,
"What atout the other five percent?" To many, this
demanding of perfection, even though they realized that many
times they would not he perfect, was a source of pride. The
other ships we visited went about stressing the importance
of achieving excellence in all undertakings in different
ways, but they all fccused on the achievement of excellence.
Furthermore, the focus and energy devoted to excellence did
not just occur. It was directly attributable to the
commanding officers of these ships. They made devoticn to
being the best, to teing excellent in everything they and
their ship undertook one cf their priorities, and they
devoted a lot of time and energy to their role as champion
of excellence.
Giving his views en why it was important both to implic-
itly and explicitly stress aspiring to excellence to his
officers and enlisted personnel, one commanding officer
stated, "Being average stinks. Sailors did not join the
Navy tc be average. You have to rise above the rest. One
of the coii' manding officer's primary duties is to insure that
the ship does rise above the rest." To stand out from the
rest tock planning. This commanding officer was very
concerned with the importance of symbolism (acts that take
en important meaning not because of their immediate impact,
tut tecause of their harmony with the espoused values of the
command; acts that bring about a synergy because they serve
to demonstrate results being achieved are greater than the
sum of the individual contributions being made). He saw
himself as the orchestrator of the symbolism for his ship.
A lot of this had tc do with developing a positive public
relations image of the ship. When the ship did well, those
external to the ship were told about it. Why? Because the
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crew deserved the recognition, because their families
deserved to know that their loved ones were doing something
special in an excellent way, and because the crew's image of
itself wculd be enhanced by seeing their names in lights.
Again, to achieve the results he was after, this captain
stressed his actions had to be motivated by "for the crew"
and net the self-aggrandizement of the commanding officer or
any ether individual.
This commanding officer attached more importance to
managing symbolism than the others we met, but there were
ether examples of these captains being proactive towards
symbclisir when it came to developing their crew's image of
themselves and their ship. On one ship, the crew was very
proud of themselves and their perception of their profes-
sionalism. Their captain had let it be known that he would
not tolerate what he considered unprofessional behavior from
anyone on the ship and from anyone with which the ship came
into contact. During a highly successful overhaul, the
captain had stopped wcrk on the ship when it was brought to
his attention that the shipyard workers were not doing their
part to keep the ship clean. Later, during refresher
training, the captain had thrown one of the inspectors off
the ship for what he considered unprofessional behavior, and
shortly thereafter, when the ship was not getting any mail
on a short deployment, he had sent a blast to the organiza-
tion responsible for the mail service criticizing them as
being unprofessional. Each of these acts was not motivated
to rally the crew (at least no one felt that this was the
case) , tut all of them had a very positive impact on the
crew. These acts symbolized their command's commitment to
professionalism. The crew saw the captain's words about
professional behavior at all cost as being in harmony with
his actions, and they admired this. In fact, to the
officers and enlisted men, including the chiefs, these
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stories were a great source of pride. These stories were
powerful reninders cf what the ship stood for, what the
priorities were. They were not just sea stories, they were
beginning to take the form cf myths that would serve in the
future to galvanize the ship's image of itself. We heard
these stories from almost every group we met on this ship,
from the captain to the E3's, and one got the feeling that
these stories were used to let new personnel joining this
ship that this is what the ship is all about.
It was interesting to note the similarities and differ-
ences in the roles the captains of these excellent ships
chose for themselves. They all tended to take a "big
picture" outlook on the running of their ships. They felt
that the? were the setters of policy and the painters and
communicators of the vision for the ship. Although many
felt that they had the ability to run portions cf their
ships more effectively than a .jiven department head, they
did net think it appropriate to do so. Rather, they saw the
temptation to micro- manage their less knowledgeaole subordi-
nates, but, by and large, they successfully fought the temp-
tation tc dc so. They felt tnat it was important for the
effective management of the ship, and, in most cases, for
the professional development of the individuals concerned,
that the captain serve as the monitor rather than as the
i..:jlem«nter of the .performance of the ship. As a monitor,
1 Dwever, they differed i lot in how they performed this
function. Some kept detailed records of what was going on
in the ship and what was being required of the ship by
outside activities, whereas, others washed their hands of the
details almost exclusively. One captain took pride in
relating that he did not maintain a single file in his
cabin, another showed us his black three ring binder with
which he tracked all zone inspection discrepancy lists.
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Eespite their differences in leadership style, philos-
ophy, and manner, these officers had several common attri-
butes that contributed to their success and their ships'
successes. From a simple skills profile derived from
discussions with their subordinates, we felt that each of
these captains was considered competent to exceptionally
competent as technical engineers, administrators, communica-
tors, and seamen. Some stood out as being extremely
talented in one or more of these categories. Ncne was
considered weak in ar.y of the categories. However, it did
not appear that the success of these commanding officers was
attributable primarily to their skills as technical experts,
administrators, communicators, or seamen. Rather, in the
cpinicn of these commanding officers and the opinion of
their subordinates, their success was mainly a result of
their ability to specify a direction in which they wanted to
take their command and their ability to gain the cocmitment
cf their officers and enlisted personnel to follow them in
this erdeavor. How they did this differed markedly from
captain to captain, but there was no denying the fact that
eacn captain was able to get across to his crew where the
command was heading and to gain from his crew the cotrinitment
and effort to do whatever it took to get to this ccmmon
visioE.
Much of the success of these officers had to do with
their attention to the processes needed and used tc manage
and lead people. But before getting into the specifics of
what processes these officers concentrated on and how they
influenced tha processes to jet the results they were after,
it is important to reiterate that all of these officers were
ver *' task oriented. That is, they had a shared view cf the
djmir.ar.ce of the mission of the ship being the sole reason
for the existence of their ship, and they would r.ot be
satisfied with their peri oruaLce or tneir ship's performance
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if they were judged to be anything but outstanding when it
came to accomplishing their ship's mission. This was a
givenJ As such, it did net get a lot of air time when we
talked with these officers. Instead of talking about the
importance cf the task, they preferred, as did their subor-
dinates, tc talk abcut the means used to achieve this cne
end, missicn accomplishment. But don't let anything that
has been said or follows give you the impression that task
accomplishment was net the bottom line for these commanding
officers. These captains were not driven to have the
happiest ships in the fleet; they were driven to being the
fightingest ships. However, along the way to being the
fightingest, a lot cf these ships discovered that they were
among the happiest; and this had something to do with their
being the fightingest. Instead of finding themselves in the
proverbial vicious circle, they were where most of us would
like to be, on a spiral leading higher and higher towards
enhanced performance. One chief saw this happening at his
level. As he put it, "We take care of our gear, which
causes fewer casualties, which gives us more time for
preventive maintenance, which results in better operating
equipment, and it just gets better."
Having put missicn accomplishment in its rightful place,
at the top of each of these commanding officers' priority
list, we can now move forward. In addition to an overriding
concern for the acccmplish ment of the tasks facing their
ships, these captains focused on their personnel as the one
resource over which they had control that could make a major
difference in how the ship performed. In dealing with
personnel, both officer and enlisted, there were many
different views and philosophies on how to lead and manage,
but there was a consensus on the importance of personnel to
any formula for success. As one captain put it, "The lenger
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I'm here, the more I come to realize the importance of
people tc the success of my ship." 6
6 Iieutenant ColcEel Jim Berg, U.S. Army, has published
articles on both high performing individuals and high
performing crganiza ticns. He describes the attributes of
high performing individuals as follows: works smarter not
harder, not a workahclic afraid of failure. is "an extraor-
dinary delegater"; has holistic fitness- taking care of his
mind and body to combat stress; visualizes what he wants
then trusts and believes in himself that he will achieve
what he wants; concentrates his energy on actions that fit
into his game plan (purpose and goals) and on actions that
only he can do; has a positive and confident self-image
tending net to get down on himself; networks with both
professional and social companions being very much a team
player; and believes strongly in the purpose of his organi-
zation. Our discussions with the commanding officers of
these excellent ships and with their subordinates led us to
conclude that these captains possess many of the attributes
of the high performing individual that Lieutenant Colonel
Berg described. However. although these individual attri-
butes have much to dc with the success of these captains'
ships. it is our view that their ships' achievement of
excellence is due primarily to these officers' ability to
transfer many of these positive attributes to their subordi-
nates. £Ref . 5
]
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XIV. SAIL OR S, OOR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE
By now, it should be self-evident that much of what was
right with these excellent ships had to do with their
concern for the people who manned them and with developing a
climate which nurtured a high level of individual commitment
to the ships' visions of excellence. The pride, teamwork,
high energy level, common direction, and commitment found on
these ships all had to do with the attention given to the
officers and men who manned these ships. In fact, one can
find the hare essence of the success of these ships by
looking at the attitudes of their people, from the captain
to the junior mess cook. What follows is a look at these
portions of personnel aspects of these snips that contrib-
uted to the ships being excellent at not only taking care of
their personnel, but also being able to take care of their
tasking. For on all of these ships, attenticn to personnel
was not seen as an end in itself, but as the most important
variable in their fcrmula for success, for being battle
ready.
As was mentioned earlier, teamwork was a recurring
attribute found on the excellent ships. It was also an
attribute that contributed to the excellent performance of
these ships. But hew was this positive attribute achieved?
Except for one ship whose captain went out of his way to
stress the importance of teamwork and the achieving of the
feeling of individual ownership for the ship's problems, the
other ships, on first glance, may have appeared to have been
the benign beneficiaries of a sense of teamwork and all the
positive ramifications of this important ingredient.
However, upon closer inspection of the leadership and
management styles found on these ships, it became clear that
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teamwork was a logical by-product of a concern for people in
general.
Here are some of the more effective things we observed
these ships doing in the area of "personnel readiness," a
term used by one of the commanding officers to describe one
of the two goals for his ship, "combat readiness" being the
ether goal.
A. CCNCIRN FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS GROWTH
Even though not all felt that their command cared about
them as individuals and about the contribution they made to
the success of their organization, the majority of officers
and enlisted personnel that we talked to on these excellent
ships truly believed that their efforts were appreciated and
that their command was concerned with their welfare. For
example, training programs were not seen as hoops that the
ships made their personnel jump through in an effort to meet
nebulous requirements from on high or as part of seme
inspection requirement. Rather the training programs were
seen as manifestations of the commands* concern for doing
things right and as programs that were in harmony with the
commands' pronouncements on the importance they attached to
an individual's self-development. Frequently we heard
comments like, "I've never been on a ship that had such a
great training program" or "This ship really cares about
training. It is not just a paper work drill like it was on
my other ships." Statements like this were coming from
chiefs who had upwards to twenty years in the Navy. When it
came to training and to professional and personal growth,
their current ship was different than others in which they
had served. In general, they felt that the training program
was working as they always thought it should have on their
ether ships, but for various reasons never had. The
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training program and their current command, in general, were
helping them grow as professional sailors and as
individuals.
Although the emphasis on self-development seemed
strongest for the enlisted personnel on these ships, officer
development was not ignored. Several of the ships had SWO
programs with which the junior officers were very pleased,
and, in general, the officers felt that they were teing
adequately prepared for their next level of responsibility.
The junior officers were pleased with their preparations for
tecoming department heads, the department heads were on
track for their becoming executive officers, and the execu-
tive officers were ready or being made ready for command.
In addition to an emphasis on training, on several of
the ships we observed there was a similar emphasis or. educa-
tion, especially for those who did not have a high school
diploma. One captain, in particular, put an especially high
priority on education. He saw helping a sailor enhance his
education as a logical element of an overall command plan
that emphasized the importance of personal growth and
enhancing crew members' self-image. At this command, educa-
tion programs were conducted during working hours. To the
crew this was perceived as strong action by the ccmmand
supporting their words regarding their concern for the
crew's welfare and personal development. When people
completed ai educaticn program, and a lot did, the command
made a "big deal" out of their accomplishments. Admirals
were invited over to the ship to attend graduation ceremo-
nies and to award diplomas and recognize accomplishments.
The crew was totally behind the command's efforts tc make
education and personal development a "big deal." There were
all types of positive side effects to this emphasis on
education and personal accomplishments. The men's pride in
themselves and their unit increased. The command's
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reputation with senior officers was enhanced. Such events
were great for the ship's public affairs program with the
concomitant benefit of raising the image of the ship in the
eyes of those who read such things as base newspapers
(future crew members, wives and family of current crew
members)
.
However, it was important to the captain of this
ship, and to the crew, that the education program was viewed
not for its secondary benefits, but for its primary aim:
developing the ship's most important resource, the average
sailor.
A strong concern for the welfare and development of the
officers and enlisted personnel existed or each of the
ships. The strength of this concern varied from ship to
ship as did the relative emphasis on what was considered to
be most important for the welfare and growth of the crew,
but the concern was always there and it was always appreci-
ated by the crew. Cn some ships quality of life (messing
and berthing, sports, education programs, etc.) was stressed
more than the more intangible motivators, such as recogni-
tion cf good performance and enhancement of self-image, and
on other ships the enrhasis was reversed. However, every
ship gave attention to both the physical and the mental
aspects cf caring. 7
B. NC CHE FELT UNDERUTILIZED
Responsibility and accountability had been pushed down
the chain of command cn these ships. On some of the ships
delegation cf responsibility occurred because it was pushed
down the chain cf command by each successive level in the
chain; cn ethers, it occurred because the captain had aade
7 Much of the attention to motivation and commitment we
saw on these excellent ships correlated very closely to
Herzberg's views on motivators falling into twe bread
categories, hygiene factors and motivational factors.
[Ref. 6]
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it clear from the beginning of his tour that everyone would
pull his fair share, which meant delegating work and its
associated accountability to the maximum extent possible.
But, no matter how the delegation of responsibility and the
pervasiveness of accountability was achieved, it was an
integral part of the "modus operandi" of these ships. The
chief petty officers were especially key players on many of
these ships. On seme, the chiefs had been charged with
being responsible for day-to-day shipboard management. On
such ships, the chiefs had accepted this responsibility with
great enthusiasm, and, without exception, they had produced
outstanding results in the opinion of their superiors. It
was noteworthy that the elevation of the importance of the
chiefs mess (relative to their perceived importance under
their previous commanding officer) had been accomplished
without alienating the Wardroom. In fact, on those ships
where the the chiefs were tasked with "running the ship,"
the officers invariarly praised the chiefs mess.
The captains set the standard for delegation on these
ships. They delegated a lot of authority to their executive
officers and department heads, but they did so without less-
ening their perceived involvement in their ships. They also
converted many of their subordinates to their views on the
importance of pushing responsibility and accountability down
the chain of command as far as it would go. One captain got
across his views en the importance of each individual
assuming responsibility and being accountable for his
actions the first time the ship got underway with him in
command. Under the previous commanding officer, the offi-
cers of the deck (OODs) used to check with the captain
before initiating any actions, or they got the captain's
input prior to taking action. The current captain let it be
known, hy his words and his actions, that the 00D was
responsible for the ship and, as such, he had to develop
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solutions to his own problems (always keeping the captain
informed). No longer did these officers bring their prob-
lems to their captain as a matter of routine. Instead, they
solved them by themselves. The captain was always in the
background insuring that the ship's safety was not in jeop-
ardy, but this was done in an unobtrusive manner. The offi-
cers on this ship read a lot into their captain's actions on
the bridge. To them, his actions spoke louder than any
words could. His actions showed that he trusted them and
that he demanded that they meet their responsibilities.
Cbviously, they thought very highly of their captain fcr his
demonstrated trust and confidence. They also internalized
the effectiveness of the captain's actions and attempted to
emulate his behavior when they dealt with their
subordinates.
Although personnel were given a lot of responsibility,
we did not find any officers or senior enlisted personnel
who felt that they were in over their heads or had toe much
responsibility. This balancing of the individual's abili-
ties and his responsibilities did not occur by chance. A
lot of attention was given to putting the right man in the
right job, especially those jobs that required a lot of
leadership expertise.
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XV. OH YES, TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT
Mayb€ the reader has been wondering if we have shcrt
changed the subject cf task accomplishment in our discussion
of excellence in the Surface Navy. We feel that we have.
One day on a ship was not enough time to cover everything,
and upon reviewing our notes, we concluded that specifics
about task accomplishment were not acquired in the airount we
desired; however, we were able to draw some conclusions.
They fellow. As we have stated several times, if there was
one thing all of these ships had in common, it was that they
were good at getting the job done. All the operational
tasking and hurdles associated with inspections, commit-
ments, assist visits, VIP visits, etc., were accomplished in
what the ships' superiors and the ships' personnel thought
was an excellent and cften superior manner. Furthermore, on
each of the ships, there was a strong sense of pride at all
levels of the chain of command surrounding their
accomplishments.
Getting results and taking pride in the results was what
these ships had in common. What differentiated them was the
approach these shijs followed in accomplishing their
results. In general, the ships we observed fell intc two
categories regarding their approach to achieving outstanding
task accomplishment. The first group consisted of those
ships which used upcoming short and long range tasking as
the focus of the ship's efforts and energy. When a task was
identified, an upcoming INSURV inspection for example, the
top management made it known that doing well on this inspec-
tion was a must and everyone was to do whatever it took to
4.0 the inspection. In this group of ships, ue found the
commanding officer who stated that achieving top results was
110
quite easy. Ycu just demanded that people go out and do
what the system requires them to do. If they get less than
100 percent, than they did not do their job as well as they
should have. In that case, it was his job to exert pressure
so that people knew that he was serious about getting the
job done. The crews of ships in this group all knew that it
meant a lot to the captain that the ship win all of the
departmental E's and the battle efficiency "E". These were
prized awards that were believed to personify the ship's
ability to get the jcb done. The link between doing well in
the competition for these awards and being battle ready was
self-evident to the leaders of the ships in this group;
therefore, they reasoned, if you want your ship to be battle
ready (all of the leaders of these ships did), you go cut
and get maximum results on the type commander's requirements
for departmental excellent awards. If you do a good job at
this, ycu will be pretty close to your overall objective of
being tattle ready.
In the ether group of ships, the importance of depart-
mental awards and the battle efficiency award was down
played by the top leaders on the ship, and the crev* saw
winning awards as somewhat of a nice surprise. We really
heard comments like, "We don't think about the awards.
Every new and then someone shows up and gives us seme
plaques for departmental excellence. These are nice, but we
are not cut to win awards. We just want to be the best ship
and to excel at everything we do. If we do this, the awards
will come, I guess." On these ships, "doing things right,
doing everything right" on a day-to-day basis was the
rallying cry and the driving force behind their outstanding
record of task accomplishment.
As was so common with many of the attributes we observed
on these ships, each ship's attitude towards task accom-
plishment, whatever it was, tended to be consistent
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throughout its chain of command. On those ships that
focused en winning awards, almost everyone we met felt that
it was important that awards be won, and that they do their
part to help the ship win the awards. On those ships that
concentrated on doing day-to-day activities right and
letting the awards take care of themselves, the officers and
men we met lined up behind this philosophy four square.
Obviously, someone had orchestrated the development cf the
consensus attitude towards task accomplishment on these
ships. The people we talked with did not see some omnipo-
tent hand moving them in the direction of this consensus,
lut we believe someone was causing this to happen, and that
someone was the captain. As was mentioned in the section on
command vision, these captains did not always have an
explicit plan of attack for developing their command
strategy and command climate and attitudes, but an effective
strategy and powerful climate always emerged - prinarily




XVI. CONCLUSIONS, COMMENTS, AND BECOMMENDATIONS
So there you have it, the views of twenty one senior
surface warfare officers on what excellence looks like and
the stories of six ships that personify excellence. And
what's to be concluded from these leaders and these ships?
First, there is a lot to be learned from talking with
senior surface warfare officers. A statement of the
blinding obvious? Maybe, but maybe not. Every officer we
met with imparted to us interesting and insightful informa-
tion about the criteria used to judge excellence in the
Surface Navy. There were very few surprises in what they
told us, but we were impressed by the uniformity of what we
were told and the strength of feeling surrounding the views
expressed by these senior officers. We had always known the
importance of squared away guarterdecks and clean and ship-
shape ships, but after talking with these senior officers we
gained a better appreciation of how the seemingly routine
fit into the whole. The linkage between cleanliness and
battle readiness, although not fully explained in a strictly
rational manner, was explained in terms of the values held
by these officers whom we believe to be typical. Chapters
two through five tell what the boss wants and some of the
why behind his desires and demands. This should make giving
him what he wants a little easier, and it should help avoid
self-delusion. You might think that you are the best oper-
ator in the fleet and that the boss realizes this and does
not care very much about the fact that your ship is not as
sharp locking or that your crew is not as turned on as some
of the others in port, but we did not run across a single
senior officer who thought in these terms. Senior officers
did net think in terms of operational excellence being the
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bottom line and everything else as being inconsequential.
Instead, they concentrated on the steps that they believe
lead to excellence, such as inspections and the developing
of a positive attitude by a crew. They believed in "the
system," and they felt that it provided the path to the goal
of battle readiness. If one followed this path, battle
readiness would result; if one did not, battle readiness
would not te achieved. Based upon the benefits we received
from talking with a broad group of senior officers on the
subject of excellence in the Surface Navy, we strongly
recommend that senior officers take the time to have similar
discussions with junicr officers. We believe the benefits
of allowing junior and mid-grade officers the opportunity to
talk candidly with senior officers about the "whats" and
"hows" of excellence would be of significant value to these
officers.
When we went aboard these excellent ships, we were
wondering what we would find. Would these ships appear to
be no different than those that we had served in previously?
Well, it did not take us long to realize that these ships
were different. There was a positive atmosphere and high
energy about these ships that neither of us had encountered
previously and, coupled with the outstanding operational
reputations of these ships, we knew that we had hit upon
something that would te of value to us as naval officers and
something that could be of value to others in the surface
community. Unfortunately that "something" was not all that
solid and describable. It was there, there was no doubt
about it. But to put it into words was another matter.
Even the people whc were part of these ships and their
superiors said things like, "You can't put your finger on
it, but you can feel it," when describing these ships.
Chapters six through fifteen are our attempt to put our
finger en it. There is a lot of "motherhood" in our
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observations, and we don't think there are any new concepts
of management and leadership. We did not stumble upon a new
model for aralyzing excellence or a new theory for achieving
excellence. Our findings are in agreement with almost every
took that we have read on leadership and management. Cur
observations confirmed for us Herzberg's views en motiva-
tion, the effectiveness of attending to all levels of
Maslow's hierarchy of needs, Berg's generic attributes of
excellent organizations, the power of recognition as
described by Blanchard, the validity of McGregor's theory Y
assumptions about people in organizations, and the impor-
tance of stressing bcth concern for task and concern for
people as Blake and Mouton have pointed out in their mana-
gerial grid concept. Peters and Waterman summed up what we
saw when they wrote in In Search of Excellence, "Excellent
companies were, above all, brilliant on the basics."
Excellent surface ships are also brilliant on the basics.
As such, they are able to achieve synergy, that is, they are
able to take average abilities and combine them in such a
manner that the end product is greater than the sum of the
parts, the individuals who make up these organizations. The
comraor man can produce uncommon results; you don't need an
all-star team to have a great ship. And, if there is a
starting point for the achievement of excellence, it is
havirg a captain who knows what excellence looks like and
knows hew to share his vision with his personnel while
simultaneously gaining their commitment to the attainment of
excellence.
The value of this study to its authors has been signifi-
cant, and it is our opinion that the study offers value to
the Navy in general. The excellence we observed on these
ships was not the result of luck. It was the result of the
leadership of the commanding officers of these ships. These
officers joined their ships with a vision of excellence and
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then they turned their vision into reality. In addition to
striving for the common goal of operational excellence, we
were struck by the fact that these commanding officers and
their ships demonstrated a consistent and common set of
attributes that lead to their achievement of excellence.
They developed individuals and groups that were proud and
energetic aid that worked as a team. They not only passed
their vision of excellence and the means for achieving
excellence to their subordinates, they developed a climate
that led to their vision being internalized by the vast
majority cf their subordinates. Throughout the entire
process of achieving excellence, the leaders of these ships
focused on the tasks of the ship, but additionally, they
focused on gaining the commitment of their crew. It is our
strong opinion that the excellence we observed on these
ships can be achieved throughout the surface community and
should be used as a beacon for those in search cf such
excellence. There was a consistency that ran through these
ships. There are common attributes of excellence. This
paper is our attempt to nail down what these attributes are
and what they look like. The attributes we identified were:
- Good ships getting better
- Pride in evidence at all levels
- Teamwork, not just a concept but a way of life
- The ship in automatic
- High energy level/bias towards action
- Presence of a common vision and shared values
- As the captain, so is the ship
- Sailers, our most important resource
- Oh yes, task accomplishment
and were chosen (1) to give the reader an appreciation of
what excellence looked like on these ships, and (2) to illu-
minate the means used to achieve this excellence.
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Obviously, we do not believe we have written the definitive
study en excellence in the Surface Navy. The attributes we
have chosen to describe were the ones that impressed us.
Others may have interpreted what we saw differently. But we
believe we are close to the mark when it comes to describing
excellence in the Surface Navy. More should be done,
however. There are many excellent ships that we were not
able to observe. Furthermore, we limited our study of
excellence to the surface community. We hope that our paper
will serve as a starting point for further study and discus-
sion of rot only excellence in the Surface Navy, but also of
excellence in other Navy communities. We fully support the
efforts of the Director, Human Resources Management Division
(OP 15) and the McBer Company in their on-going study aimed
at differentiating between top performing units and average
and telow average units in both ship and aviation commands.
Furthermore, we recommend integrating the lessens of
"Excellence in the Surface Navy" into the Navy's leadership
and management training. The Navy can only gain from an
enhanced understanding at all levels of command of what
excellence looks like and how the best are able to achieve
excellence. There nay be no right or wrong answers when it
comes to leadership and management, but there are benefits
to be had from an evolving analysis and discussion of what
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